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1Introduction
Economic decisions reveal information about the person making them. In plenty
of situations, they are informative of some important and valued traits, for in-
stance, of one’s prosociality or morality. This gives rise to a strong behavioral
motive, as people care about how the society perceives them, but also, they care
about how they perceive themselves. These two motives, commonly known as
social and self-image concerns (see Bénabou and Tirole, 2006), are frequently
present in our day to day life, and thus have a propensity to shape a variety
of our decisions. Moreover, people do not only care about what others might
think of them due to their behavior, but they also are concerned about what oth-
ers might do if the behavior is met with disapproval. In particular, violation of
important social norms is often followed by norm-enforcing behavior, as others
punish those that violate them (see Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Similarly to
image concerns, the threat of punishment is a common motive, as the society is
intertwined with relevant social norms which people are willing to enforce.
This thesis consists of four essays which contribute to a better understanding
of the behavioral impact of image concerns as well as norm-enforcing behavior. All
of them employ experiments, either in a lab setting or a lab-in-the-field setting,
and together focus on the behavior of adults as well as the behavior of children
and adolescents.
In Chapter 2 (joint work with Armin Falk and Simone Quercia), I study how
self and social image concerns influence prosocial behavior. A stream of evidence
from economics and psychology indicates the importance of the two notions of
image concerns as drivers of prosocial behavior; however, no study compares
them. We, therefore, develop a symmetric design that allows us to contrast the
influence of the two notions. In a large scale dictator game, we exogenously in-
crease self-awareness and observability in order to direct subjects’ focus on their
private and public self, respectively. We show that both self and social image
concerns are drivers of prosocial behavior. We observe, however, that manipulat-
ing observability causes a stronger increase in prosocial behavior compared to
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self-awareness. We also document a marked gender difference in self-image con-
cerns, shedding light on the different effect sizes across our treatments. While
both genders react similarly to the observability manipulation, only men react
to the self-awareness manipulation, closing the initial gender gap in prosocial
behavior. We report evidence indicating that men tend to be generally less self-
aware than women, i.e., they are less focused on their prosocial standards, but
can be “nudged” towards them.
In Chapter 3 (joint work with Armin Falk and Simone Quercia), I study how
self and social image concerns influence lying behavior. Image concerns are of-
ten hypothesized as an important component of lying costs. In a standard die-
rolling paradigm, we expose subjects to the same manipulations as in Chapter 2,
and find that an increase in self-awareness has no effect on their reports. In con-
trast, we show that an increase in subjects’ observability, while still maintaining
their private information, significantly decreases their reports (and with it, their
profits). We finally show in a survey experiment that respondents believe that
the likelihood of a lie increases with the reported outcome, and attribute neg-
ative traits to people who make high reports. This further supports reputation
concerns as the explanation behind the results of our social image treatment.
In Chapter 4 (joint work with Armin Falk and Simone Quercia), I study how
self and social image concerns influence prosocial behavior in childhood and
adolescence. While lots of studies focus on the effect of image concerns in adults,
very little is known about their roots in young age. We show that in a dictator
game with 7-14 year-old subjects, both self and social image concerns matter,
however, only for boys: i) boys give more when social image concerns are in-
creased, significantly more so than girls, who do not react, ii) boys give more
when self-image concerns are increased, while girls do not, and iii) support-
ing evidence indicates that the observed gender asymmetry is not due to differ-
ences in understanding of normative behavior, suggesting an actual difference
in concerns for appearing prosocial. Our results support evolutionary theories
suggesting that men should be more inclined to signal prosociality as well as
recent predictions about the age when reputation should start playing a role.
In Chapter 5 (joint work with Armin Falk and Fabian Kosse), I study the
development of egalitarian norm enforcement in childhood and adolescence.
Egalitarian norm is a long-existing organizing principle, commonly enforced
by adults across societies. We investigate the development of this enforcing-
behavior with 9-18 year-old subjects, by taking the most commonly-used third-
party punishment game where a third party is added to a dictator game, and
adapting it for children. We show that children start enforcing the egalitarian
norm at the age of 11-12. In addition, we show that: i) as the egalitarian norm
enforcement emerges, a non-negligible proportion of punishers also disapprove
of overly-generous transfers that exceed the norm, ii) the punishers’ behavior
only changes until 13-14 years of age, indicating that egalitarian norm enforce-
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ment is mainly developed by that period, and iii) the dictators increase their
transfer in the direction of the egalitarian norm primarily in the period when
norm enforcement develops.
Taken together, this thesis focuses on the behavioral impact of self and social
image concerns and norm-enforcing behavior. It explores the two by employing
several experimental paradigms and eliciting behavior across different age co-
horts, thus providing a multitude of insights and contributions to the respective
literatures.
References
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2Self-image, Social Image and
Prosocial Behavior ?
Joint with Armin Falk and Simone Quercia
2.1 Introduction
Prosocial behavior is widespread in humans, and it influences a wide range of
societal functions and outcomes, such as the provision of public goods, redistri-
bution, charitable giving, volunteering, contract enforcement, trade, and growth
(Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1997; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Car-
penter and Myers, 2010; Fehr et al., 1997; Guiso et al., 2009; Zak and Knack,
2001). Given its relevance, a large literature is dedicated to understanding its
underlying motives. In recent years, increasing attention has been given to self-
image and social image concerns (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Dana et al., 2007;
Ariely et al., 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2012; A. Gneezy et al., 2012; Grossman,
2014; Falk, 2017; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017; Bénabou et al., 2018).
Self-image concerns refer to an individual’s desire to view him- or herself as
prosocial. Social image concerns, on the other hand, refer to an individual’s de-
sire to be viewed as prosocial by others. Both motives are considered as crucial
determinants of prosociality, and are especially interesting given their poten-
tial as basis for cost-effective policies (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Alpizar et al.,
2008; Powell et al., 2012; Shu et al., 2012). For example, putting emphasis on
one’s social image was shown to induce a 25% to 48% increase in donations
(Alpizar et al., 2008; Powell et al., 2012). Given that in 2016 in the US alone
? We thank Peter Andre, Dorothea Kübler, Johanna Mollerstrom, Angelo Romano, Peter
Schwardmann, Egon Tripodi, Roberto Weber, Joël van der Weele, and various seminar audiences
for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support by Leibniz Programme of the
German Science Foundation (DFG) and Institute on Behavior & Inequality (briq).
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donations exceeded 390 billion dollars, such policies can have a substantial eco-
nomic impact.
While there exists evidence on the importance of both self-image (Dana et
al., 2007; Grossman, 2014; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017; Falk, 2017) and
social image concerns (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009; DellaV-
igna et al., 2012), no study simultaneously investigates and compares the two
domains. Therefore, in this paper, we design symmetric manipulations which
directly and independently test the influence of self-image and social image
concerns on prosocial behavior, allowing us to directly compare the two image
domains. In addition, we investigate the effect of gender within our paradigm,
as evolutionary theories conjecture that gender had a strong mediating role in
the evolution of costly prosocial signaling (Amotz Zahavi and Avishag Zahavi,
1999; E. A. Smith and Bird, 2000; Barclay, 2010; Böhm and Regner, 2013; Van
Vugt and Iredale, 2013; Raihani and S. Smith, 2015).
To design ourmanipulations, we build on recent theoretical work of Bénabou
et al. (2018), which implies that self-image concerns arise from the awareness
of discrepancy between internal standards or values and the self (e.g., in light
of current behavior). Following this framework, we propose that an increase
in one’s self-awareness will make self-image concerns more salient and cause
a larger personal cost when deviating from internal standards. This reasoning
dates back to the theory of objective self-awareness (Duval andWicklund, 1972),
which is supported by a stream of psychological studies (Duval and Wicklund,
1973; Carver, 1975; Diener and Wallbom, 1976; Duval et al., 1979; Beaman
et al., 1979). Regarding social image concerns, Bénabou et al. (2018) concep-
tualize them as reputational concerns vis-à-vis others, similarly to other studies
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, 2011). Reputation has attracted the interest of sev-
eral disciplines, since it represents a key evolutionary pillar of cooperation and
prosocial behavior in humans (Roberts, 1998; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Pan-
chanathan and Boyd, 2004). In light of this, to make social image concerns more
salient we put participants’ reputation at stake by increasing the observability of
their actions.
We test the influence of the two image domains on generosity, a fundamen-
tal facet of human prosociality. In all of our treatments, participants (n = 531)
play a dictator game where they have to decide how much of their 10 euro en-
dowment they would like to give to a recipient who participates in a different
experimental session. To manipulate self-awareness we expose participants to a
real-time video of their own face on the computer screen, which is transmitted
from a video camera installed on top of the computer screen as in Falk (2017).
To manipulate observability, we expose participants to a real-time video of an-
other participant’s face, in an analogous way as in the self-image manipulation.
This other participant is also sitting in a private cubicle in the lab, and is viewing
the decision maker’s face and his or her computer screen in real time. It is gener-
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ally difficult to compare the relative strength of self and social image concerns,
and previous ways to manipulate the two differ typically in many dimensions
(Alpizar et al., 2008; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009; DellaV-
igna et al., 2012; Grossman, 2014; Falk, 2017; Grossman and van der Weele,
2017). We render such a comparison plausible by using the same type of manip-
ulation, a video, varying only whether participants see themselves or are being
seen by someone else. We compare these two treatments to a Control treatment
where participants see a neutral prerecorded video of another person. The pre-
recorded video ensures that the effects of our image treatments are not due
to cognitive depletion (Rand et al., 2012; Schulz et al., 2014; Achtziger et al.,
2015; Rand et al., 2016) or social cues (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al.,
2006; Rigdon et al., 2009, see Materials and methods section (2.4) for detailed
descriptions of treatments and procedures).
2.2 Results
Fig. 2.1 shows the average euro amount given by dictators across our treatments.
We first compare the amount given by dictators in our Control treatment (n
= 188) with the one in the Self-image treatment (n = 189). Dictators in the
Control treatment gave on average 1.54 euros, while they gave 1.93 euros in the
Self-image treatment. This difference is significant at the 10% level (two-sided
t-test, p = 0.065, Cohen’s d = 0.191). Moving to the Social image treatment (n
= 154), we observe a much stronger impact of the manipulation on prosocial
behavior, as participants on average gave 2.49 euros, in contrast to 1.54 euros
in the Control treatment (two-sided t-test, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.475). The
average amount given in the Social image treatment was also significantly larger
than the one in the Self-image treatment (two-sided t-test, p = 0.013, Cohen’s
d = 0.270). These results are robust to controls for socio-demographics and Big
5 personality traits using regression analyses (see Table 2.1 in Appendix).
Next, we investigate treatment differences across genders. Gender is of par-
ticular interest in our setting as it has been proposed that evolution favored asym-
metric concerns for social image and costly signaling across genders. Specifically,
men might benefit more from signaling generous traits in public as a successful
mating strategy compared to women (Amotz Zahavi and Avishag Zahavi, 1999;
E. A. Smith and Bird, 2000; Barclay, 2010; Böhm and Regner, 2013; Van Vugt
and Iredale, 2013; Raihani and S. Smith, 2015). Figure 2.2 depicts our treat-
ment effects separately for men (left panel) and women (right panel). In line
with the stylized facts from previous literature (Engel, 2011), we observe that
in the Control treatment women give on average significantly more than men
(1.95 vs. 0.94 euros; two-sided t-test, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.539). However,
when comparing the amount given by men and women in the Self-image treat-
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Figure 2.1. Average euro amount given by dictators across treatments
Notes: Error bars indicate standard error of the means.
ment, the gender gap disappears. In particular, women give on average 2.04,
while men give 1.76 (two-sided t-test, p = 0.388, Cohen’s d = 0.128). This dif-
ference is primarily due to a change in men’s behavior. Men’s giving increases
significantly by 0.82 euros, while women’s giving only increases by 0.09 euros,
respectively (two-sided t-test, p = 0.016 for men, p = 0.758 for women, Cohen’s
d= 0.395 for men, Cohen’s d= 0.041 for women). Regression analysis confirms
that men react significantly stronger to the Self-image treatment compared to
women (see Table 2.2 in Appendix). Next, we look at the effect of our social
image manipulation across genders. Similar to the Control treatment, there ex-
ists a gender gap in giving, albeit smaller, in the Social image treatment. Men
give 2.10 euros on average, while women give 2.75 (two-sided t-test, p = 0.056,
Cohen’s d= 0.317). The persistence of this gap is largely driven by the fact that
both men and women increase the amount given when exposed to higher ob-
servability. Men increase their giving by 1.16 euros, while women increase their
giving by 0.80 euros (two-sided t-test, p = 0.001 for men, p = 0.004 for women,
Cohen’s d= 0.577 for men, Cohen’s d= 0.411 for women). Regression analysis
confirms that there is no significant difference across genders in the reaction
to increased observability (see Table 2.2 in Appendix). Comparing the two im-
age treatments, we observe no difference for men, but a significant difference
for women (two-sided t-test, p = 0.390 for men, p = 0.010 for women, Cohen’s
d = 0.148 for men, Cohen’s d = 0.362 for women). The interaction between
gender and the two image treatments is, however, not significant (see Table 2.2
in Appendix). Finally, we find no effect of the observer’s gender on the average
amount given by men or women (see Table 2.3 in Appendix).
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Figure 2.2. Average euro amount given by male dictators (left panel) and female
dictators (right panel) across treatments
Notes: Error bars indicate standard error of the means.
The gender results shed light on the weak overall effect of our Self-image
treatment, and raise an important question on the potential underlying mech-
anisms of the observed self-image gender difference. It is difficult to reconcile
this finding in light of aforementioned evolutionary theories, as they primar-
ily suggest a gender difference in the social image domain, for which we find
only weak evidence. Alternatively, a straightforward hypothesis might be that
women are naturally more self-aware than men, i.e., they are generally more
aware of their inner standards of prosociality, while men need to be “reminded”
of them. We report three measures supporting this hypothesis. First, we inves-
tigate the level of situational self-awareness across genders in the Self-image
and Control treatment. For this purpose, we elicited self-focus using a sentence
completion task, as self-focus is indicative of the current level of self-awareness
(Exner Jr., 1973; Carver and Scheier, 1978, see Subsection 2.4.5 for a detailed
description). The elicitation occurred after the decisions were made but before
the cameras were turned off. We test whether women are more self-focused in
the Control treatment but not in the Self-image treatment. As expected, we find
that women exhibit significantly higher self-focus compared to men only in the
Control treatment (two-sided t-test, p = 0.039 for Control treatment, p = 0.334
for Self-image treatment). Next, we check if there is a dispositional tendency
for women to be more self-aware. We invited a subsample of our main sample
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one week after the main experiment (n= 207 , see Subsection 2.4.6 for details),
in order to collect the measures of interest when our camera manipulation had
arguably no effect anymore. We first test whether women are more privately self-
conscious than men. Private self-consciousness measures a consistent tendency
to focus one’s attention towards oneself, i.e., it indicates the level of “chronic
self-awareness” (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Carver and Scheier, 1978, see Subsec-
tion 2.4.6 for a detailed description). We find evidence that, indeed, women are
more privately self-conscious than men (two-sided t-test, p = 0.057). Further-
more, if women have a tendency of being more aware of their inner standards,
one might expect them to perceive those standards as more relevant for them-
selves compared tomen.We analyze the relevance of prosocial values as a part of
one’s self-image by eliciting the importance of generosity for self-image (Gross-
man and van der Weele, 2017, see Subsection 2.4.6 for a detailed description).
As expected, we find that women score significantly higher than men (two-sided
t-test, p < 0.001). Overall, this evidence suggests that women may be in general
more self-aware about their inner standards; hence, self-image concerns may
play an important role for them even in the absence of our treatment manipula-
tion. It further suggests that men’s inner standards are also prosocial, but men
need to be “nudged” towards them.
2.3 Discussion and conclusion
We have shown that both self and social image concerns are important drivers of
prosocial behavior. Building on a recent theoretical literature, we have designed
exogenous manipulations increasing self-awareness and observability to study
the influence of self and social image concerns, respectively. One big advantage
of our design is that it allows drawing parallels between the two image domains
and opens the discussion about the relative importance of self and social im-
age concerns. Across our comparable manipulations, the one affecting social im-
age induces a stronger increase in prosociality, suggesting that being concerned
about one’s own social reputation may on average be a more powerful motive
than being concerned about one’s own opinion of oneself. Our findings offer
relevant implications in light of potential policies, as both self and social image
concerns can be cost-effective ways of inducing a person to act more in line with
normative standards (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Alpizar et al., 2008; Powell
et al., 2012; Shu et al., 2012). For instance, to increase the amount of charita-
ble donations, one could ask specific personal questions to raise self-awareness
(Silvia and Eichstaedt, 2004), or make donations public to raise observability.
Our results indicate that both dimensions of image-based policies can yield a
desirable increase in donations, but they favor an increase in observability as
the more effective approach.
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Interestingly, the weaker effect of the Self-image treatment can be explained
by the fact that only men react to the increase of self-awareness. This find-
ing contributes to the literature on gender and prosociality, where women are
generally found to be more prosocial (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Croson
and U. Gneezy, 2009; Engel, 2011; Falk et al., forthcoming). Recent studies
propose that this difference may be due to a distinction on a neurobiological
level (Soutschek et al., 2017), or due to a gender specific disposition to intu-
itive decision-making which affects prosocial behavior (Rand et al., 2016). We
offer another piece of evidence showing that men might in general be less self-
aware than women. We have provided evidence along these lines using three
different measures that all support the explanation that men are less focused on
their inner standards. Reminding them of their “inner self”, however, corrects
for this difference and shows that their inner standards are also prosocial, but
not as salient as for women. This opens interesting questions for future research.
Our self-awareness evidence would suggest that similar gender findings should
also exist in other morally relevant domains. If so, such studies could illuminate
gender differences on a broader level.
2.4 Materials and methods
2.4.1 Subject pool
Participants were recruited from the BonnEconLab subject pool with hroot (Bock
et al., 2014). 531 subjects participated as dictators and were matched with re-
cipients that participated in a different experimental session. For the purposes
of the Social image treatment, additional 154 subjects were recruited for the role
of observers. Out of the 531 dictators, 317 were women (59.7%), and the mean
age was 23.78 (sd = 5.69).
2.4.2 Experimental procedures
The experiment was conducted in the BonnEconLab at the University of Bonn.
The sessions were ran in February 2016 and July 2017. Participants were seated
in cubicles and were given several minutes to read the dictator game instruc-
tions alone. After that, the experimenter read the instructions aloud. Participants
were informed that their respective recipients did not participate in the current
session, but would participate in the study at a different point in time. They
were also informed that the recipients will be fully informed about the game
structure and their decision in the game (for experimental instructions see Ap-
pendix 2.F). Before taking their decisions, participants had to answer several
control questions (see Appendix 2.B). After having taken their decisions, partic-
ipants were exposed to additional tasks and a questionnaire. Subjects did not
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know any details of the subsequent tasks while they were taking decisions in
the dictator game. The experiment was conducted using z-tree software (Fis-
chbacher, 2007).
2.4.3 Treatments
The experiment consisted of 3 treatments: Self-image, Social image and Control.
In all treatments dictators were facing identical procedures, except for the con-
tent of the video on their decision screen and information explaining the video.
In the Self-image treatment, they saw a real-time video of their face transmitted
from a camera installed on top of their computer screen (see Figure 2.3 and
Figure 2.4 in Appendix). In the Social image treatment, they saw a real-time
video of their paired observer’s face streamed from a camera installed on the
observer’s computer screen. Likewise, observers saw a real-time video of the dic-
tator’s face streamed from a camera installed on the dictator’s computer screen.
Moreover, the observers also saw a real-time image of the computer screen of the
decision maker. In the Control treatment, participants saw a prerecorded video
of a famous German news presenter during a news segment (see Figure 2.5
in Appendix). The videos were already on at the moment participants entered
the cubicles, and were turned off before the questionnaire began. In the Self-
image treatment, participants were informed that only they could see the video,
and that the video was not being recorded. In the Social image treatment, the
roles of dictators and observers were randomly assigned. Observers had a spe-
cial set of paper instructions laid in front of their computer, which were not read
aloud. These instructions explained that their only task was to observe their
paired dictator and that they would earn 8 euros for participation. Dictators
were aware about the observer’s task. Furthermore, they knew that only their
paired observer could see their real-time video, that the video was not being
recorded, and that the observers would leave the lab before them. They were
not informed of the observer’s payoff to avoid any type of social comparison,
e.g., inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). In both the Self and Social
image treatment, in order to give some meaning to the camera, subjects were
also informed that at the end of the experiment, they would answer a few short
questions on the camera technology and settings. In the Control treatment, we
used the video of the news presenter rather than a condition with no video for
two main reasons: first, it allows us to control for potential cognitive depletion
(Rand et al., 2012; Schulz et al., 2014; Achtziger et al., 2015; Rand et al., 2016)
due to the mere presence of a video, and second, it controls for potential so-
cial cues effects that could arise due to the presence of a “pair of eyes” (Haley
and Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006; Rigdon et al., 2009). Given the choice
of our Control treatment, both the video and the “pair of eyes” are present in
all three treatments, thus eliminating the potential confounds. As the content
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of the video was immediately recognizable, participants were perfectly aware
that the video was prerecorded. Also, the presenter’s neutrality ensured that no
tendentious associations were triggered.
2.4.4 Post-experimental questionnaire
The post-experimental questionnaire comprised socio-demographics questions,
60-item NEO Five Factor Inventory (Costa and McCrae, 1992) and, in the Self
and Social image treatments, a few short questions about the camera settings and
technology. Furthermore, in the Social image treatment, dictators were asked if
they knew their observer before participating. Only one participant reported
of knowing the paired observer. All results are unchanged if we exclude this
observation.
2.4.5 Self-focus
Wemeasured self-focus as a proxy for self-awareness. Specifically, self-focus and
self-awareness are tightly connected notions, and self-focus is indicative of the
current level of self-awareness (see Carver and Scheier, 1978). For measuring
self-focus, we implemented the sentence completion task, which was previously
used in the psychology literature on objective self-awareness (Exner Jr., 1973;
Carver and Scheier, 1978). The task consists of 30 stems of sentences that need
to be completed. For example, the first three sentences are: “I think...”, “I was
happiest when...”, and “It’s fun to daydream about...” (see Appendix 2.C for
the list of all the stem sentences). To categorize the answers we follow Exner Jr.
(1973), that is, two research assistants unaware of our research project indepen-
dently coded the answers based on the following four categories: self-focused,
external world focused, ambivalent or neutral answer. The answers were as-
signed to one of the four categories only if both research assistants indicated
the same category (73% of all answers). The self-focus variable represents the
frequency of self-focused answers. The task was ran after the decisions but be-
fore the cameras were turned off, and was implemented only for the sessions
conducted in July 2017 (n = 93 for Control treatment, n = 95 for Self-image
treatment).
2.4.6 Private self-consciousness and the importance of generosity for
self-image
To elicit private self-consciousness, we used the self-consciousness scale (Fenig-
stein et al., 1975; Carver and Scheier, 1978). This scale consists of 23 statements.
Participants had to indicate to what extent each statement would apply to them
on a five-point likert scale (see Appendix 2.D for the list of the statements).
To estimate the importance of prosocial values as a part of one’s self-image,
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we elicited the importance of generosity for self-image (Grossman and van der
Weele, 2017), which is an adaptation of the self-importance of moral identity
questionnaire (Aquino and Reed II., 2002). We applied the scale specifically in
the context of generosity given that participants played a dictator game. Partici-
pants were asked to imagine a person with the characteristic of being generous.
Subsequently, they were prompted to indicate agreement or disagreement with
six statements about the importance of this attribute to their sense of self on a
six-point likert scale (see Appendix 2.E for the list of statements). The measure
was generated by summing the six scores. To elicit private self-consciousness
and the importance of generosity for self-image, we invited dictators participat-
ing in July 2017 sessions to participate in an additional session which took place
one week after the main experiment. 80% (n = 207) of the participants of the
first session came to the session one week after (see Appendix 2.A for robustness
checks on attrition). Participants were informed of the second week session only
at the end of the first week session, thus preserving full comparability between
sessions ran in February 2016 and July 2017.
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Appendix 2.A Second week’s attendance and attrition on
observables
To measure private self-consciousness and the importance of generosity for self-
image, dictators from our July 2017 sessions were reinvited at the end of the
session to participate one week after the main experiment in an additional ses-
sion. To match observations from the first to the second week and still preserve
anonymity, participants were instructed to generate a code which consisted
of the first two numbers of their month of birth, the first two letters of their
mother’s maiden name, and the first two letters of their place of birth. 80%
of the subjects who were reinvited showed up in the second week. To control
for selection on observables, in Table 2.4, we estimate whether variables col-
lected in the first week can be a predictor of attendance in the second week’s
session. We test the effect of the treatment assignment, dictator game behavior,
socio-demographics and personality characteristics. None of the variables has a
significant impact on the probability of attendance in the second week.
Appendix 2.B Control questions
Please answer the following questions:1
1. How many euros do you receive, and how many euros does participant B
receive at the beginning of the study?
2. Can participant B influence your decision?
3. If you send 4 euros to participant B, how many euros do you keep?
4. If you send 2 euros to participant B, how many euros do you keep?
1 The control questions were administered to dictators in all treatments.
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Appendix 2.C Sentence completion task
In the following part of the experiment your task is to complete unfinished sen-
tences. The beginning of the sentence is given, for example: “The weather...”.
You have to complete the sentence on the “...” position. Please write whatever
comes to your mind first, without long thinking.
1. I think...
2. I was happiest when...
3. It’s fun to daydream about...
4. My father...
5. If only I could...
6. It’s hardest for me...
7. I wish...
8. As a child I...
9. I am...
10. I’m at my best...
11. Others...
12. When I look in the mirror...
13. If only I would...
14. At least I’m not...
15. My sex life...
16. It upsets me when...
17. The thing I like best about myself...
18. Friends...
19. I would like most to be photographed...
20. I guess I’m...
21. My mother...
22. I wonder...
23. The worst thing about me...
24. I always wanted...
25. I try hardest to please...
26. Someday I...
27. My appearance...
28. My parents...
29. If I had my way...
30. I like...
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Appendix 2.D Self-consciousness scale
In the following you will see statements that might apply to you. Please answer
on a scale from 1 to 5 how these statements apply to you. 1 means “it does not
apply to me at all” and 5 means “it applies to me fully”.
1. I’m always trying to figure myself out.2
2. I’m concerned about my style of doing things.
3. Generally, I’m not very aware of myself. 2
4. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations.
5. I reflect about myself a lot. 2
6. I’m concerned about the way I present myself.
7. I’m often the subject of my own fantasies. 2
8. I have trouble working when someone is watching me.
9. I never scrutinize myself.2
10. I get embarrassed very easily.
11. I’m self-conscious about the way I look.
12. I don’t find it hard to talk to strangers.
13. I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings. 2
14. I usually worry about making a good impression.
15. I’m constantly examining my motives.2
16. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group.
17. One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror.
18. I sometimes have the feeling that I’m off somewhere watching myself.2
19. I’m concerned about what other people think of me.
20. I’m alert to changes in my mood.2
21. I’m usually aware of my appearance.
22. I’m aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem.2
23. Large groups make me nervous.
2 Only the marked statements are used to estimate private self-consciousness. In order to cal-
culate the private self-consciousness variable, the answers on statements 3 and 9 were reversed,
and all the marked answers were added up.
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Appendix 2.E The importance of generosity for self-image
Here is one characteristic that could describe a person: generous. The person
with this characteristic could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment,
visualize in your mind the kind of person who has this characteristic. Imagine
how that person would think, feel, and act.
When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, please re-
spond to the statements below by indicating how strongly you agree or disagree.
For each statement, the responses are (from left to right): strongly disagree, dis-
agree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, agree, strongly agree.
Choose the response that best expresses your feelings.
1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has this characteristic.
2. Being someone who has this characteristic is an important part of who I
am.
3. A big part of my emotional well-being is tied up in having this character-
istic.
4. Having this characteristic is an important part of my sense of self.
5. I strongly desire to have this characteristic.
6. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify
me as having this characteristic.
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Appendix 2.F Experimental instructions
The following section contains experimental instructions translated from Ger-
man.
2.F.1 Dictator: Control, Self-image and Social image treatment
The instructions were printed and left in front of subjects’ computer screens before
they entered the lab. At the beginning of the experiment, the instructions were read
out loud by one of the experimenters.
Welcome to this study!
You are participating in an economic study. Depending on your answers, you
can earn a certain amount of money. The money will be paid out at the end of
the study in cash. It is, therefore, very important that you read the instructions
carefully, and that you understand them.
Only for Control treatment. As you can see, there is a video playing on your
computer screen. This video will also be played during the study.
Only for Self-image treatment. As you can see, there is a camera installed on
the computer screen. The image that the camera is capturing is shown on your
computer screen in real time. Please note: No video streams are saved, and
only you and no other person can see your camera video. At the end of the
study we will ask you several short questions about the camera technology and
camera settings.
Only for Social image treatment. As you can see, there is a camera installed
on the computer screen. You can see another participant of the study. Simultane-
ously, the participant can also see you. It is strictly forbidden to communicate
in any way with this other participant, e.g, through waving, signs, facial
expressions, or similar. This other participant has the role of observer. Your ob-
server has received his own instructions, in which his task is clearly explained.
He has only one task, and that is to observe you and your decisions. Your observer
sees your computer screen in real time. That means that all the movements that
you do with your mouse, and all the decisions that you take during this study,
will be seen by your observer. Please note that there can be short delays in the
transmission of the camera video. The transmission of your screen and mouse
movements occurs with no delay. Please note: No video streams are saved,
only your observer and no other person can see your camera video. If you
disagree with this, you can finish your participation on the study now. At the
end of the study we will ask you several short questions about the camera tech-
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nology and camera settings. After the end of the study, your observer will leave
the laboratory before you.
All statementsmade in these instructions are true. This holds generally for all
studies conducted at the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research,
and also for this study.
During the study, communication between participants is forbidden. If
you have questions, then please direct them only to us. Please, raise your hand
and a member of the experimental team will come to answer privately. Violating
this rule leads to exclusion from the study.
The decisions that you make in this study do not only influence how much
you will earn, but also, how much another participant will earn. From now on,
this participant will be called Participant B.
Participant B is taking part in this study at some other time. You will not
find out before or after the study who Participant B is. The same holds true for
Participant B. Participant B will not find out who you are.
At the beginning of the study you will receive 10 euros. Participant B will
receive 0 euros.
Your task is to decide how much you want to send to Participant B. You can
send as much as you want. Participant B cannot influence your decision. He will
be informed about your options and your decision, and subsequently, he will be
paid out in cash.
For example, you can keep 7 euros for yourself, and send 3 euros to Partic-
ipant B. Or, you can keep 10 euros for yourself and send 0 euros to Participant
B. Or, you can keep 5 euros for yourself and send 5 euros to Participant B.
If you have questions, please let us know! Otherwise, we will begin im-
mediately.
2.F.2 Observer
The instructions were printed and left in front of subjects’ computer screens before
they entered the lab.
READ IMMEDIATELY
Welcome to this study!
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Important: It is strictly forbidden to communicate with the participant
that you see in the video in any way, e.g., through waving, signs, facial
expressions, or similar.
In this study you are participating in a role of observer. You only have one
task, and that is to observe another participant of the study. For this task, you
will receive a payment of 8 euros in cash at the end of the study.
On your screen you can see a video of another participant and his decision
screen in real time. That means that you will observe the decisions that this
participant takes during the study. At the same time, this participant can also
see you through the camera that is installed on your computer screen. Please
note: No video streams are saved. Except for the participant that you see,
no other person can see the video from your camera.
During the study, communication between participants is forbidden. If
you have questions, direct them to us. Raise your hand, and a member of the
experimental team will come to answer privately. If you violate this rule, you
will be excluded from the study.
The instructions that will be read out loud at the beginning of the study are
for the subjects that will take decisions. That means, they are intended for the
participant that you are observing. Listen carefully, so that you can understand
what is the task of this participant.
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Appendix 2.G Additional tables and gures
Table 2.1. OLS regressions estimates of treatment eects
Variables Dependent variable: amount given
Control & Self Control & Social Self & Social
image treat. image treat. image treat.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-image 0.389* 0.369*
(0.210) (0.199)
Social image 0.956*** 0.840*** 0.568** 0.490**
(0.220) (0.209) (0.228) (0.212)
Female (=1) 0.341 0.607** -0.033
(0.249) (0.270) (0.258)
Age -0.018 0.026 0.030
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Monthly budget 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Big5: Openness 0.190* 0.116 0.198
(0.102) (0.104) (0.121)
Big5: Extraversion -0.453*** -0.172 -0.324***
(0.107) (0.114) (0.118)
Big5: Neuroticism -0.008 -0.183 0.049
(0.122) (0.126) (0.136)
Big5: Agreeable. 0.585*** 0.599*** 0.789***
(0.104) (0.118) (0.110)
Big5: Conscient. -0.092 -0.209* -0.063
(0.113) (0.119) (0.110)
Constant 1.537*** 1.530*** 1.537*** 0.445 1.926*** 1.286***
(0.142) (0.444) (0.142) (0.439) (0.154) (0.472)
Observations 377 376 342 341 343 341
R-squared 0.009 0.127 0.053 0.191 0.018 0.159
Notes: The table presents OLS regressions using the amount given as the dependent variable. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.2. OLS regressions estimates of treatment eects by gender
Variables Dependent variable: amount given
Control Self-image Social image Control & Self Control & Social Self & Social
treatment treatment treatment image treat. image treat. image treat.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Female (=1) 1.02*** 1.04*** 0.27 0.26 0.65* 0.63* 1.02*** 1.03*** 1.02*** 1.03*** 0.27 0.27
(0.28) (0.27) (0.32) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.32) (0.33)
Age -0.00 -0.01 0.05** -0.01 0.03* 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Monthly 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
budget (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Self-image 0.83** 0.85**
(0.34) (0.33)
Self-image -0.75* -0.77*
*female (0.43) (0.43)
Social image 1.16*** 1.16*** 0.34 0.33
(0.35) (0.34) (0.39) (0.38)
Social image -0.37 -0.39 0.38 0.37
*female (0.45) (0.44) (0.47) (0.48)
Constant 0.94*** 0.76 1.76*** 1.82** 2.10*** 0.99* 0.94*** 0.87* 0.94*** 0.13 1.76*** 1.11**
(0.21) (0.58) (0.26) (0.70) (0.28) (0.58) (0.21) (0.45) (0.21) (0.42) (0.26) (0.51)
Observations 188 188 189 188 154 153 377 376 342 341 343 341
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.03
Notes: The table presents OLS regressions using the amount given as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Given that the regressions investigate the eect of gender on the amount given, we do not control for Big 5 personality traits given their known correlations with
gender (Schmitt et al., 2008).
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Table 2.3. OLS regressions estimates of the eect of observer’s gender in Social image
treatment
Variables Dependent variable: amount given
Social image
treatment
Male subjects Female subjects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female observer (=1) 0.223 0.139 -0.390 -0.244
(0.545) (0.571) (0.416) (0.449)
Age 0.039 0.065**
(0.036) (0.032)
Monthly budget 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Big5: Openness 0.247 0.062
(0.303) (0.230)
Big5: Extraversion 0.120 0.081
(0.283) (0.266)
Big5: Neuroticism -0.109 -0.164
(0.336) (0.243)
Big5: Agreeableness 1.298*** 0.502**
(0.312) (0.237)
Big5: Conscientiousness -0.575 -0.151
(0.348) (0.199)
Constant 1.952*** 1.252 2.975*** 1.292*
(0.390) (1.005) (0.321) (0.677)
Observations 61 61 93 92
R-squared 0.002 0.382 0.010 0.124
Notes: The table presents OLS regressions using the amount given as the dependent variable. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.4. Probit regressions estimates of attrition determinants
Variables Dependent variable:
next week’s participation
(1) (2)
Give 0.000 0.004
(0.013) (0.013)
Self-image -0.027 -0.012
(0.060) (0.058)
Social image 0.031 0.039
(0.063) (0.062)
Female (=1) -0.001
(0.061)
Age 0.005
(0.005)
Monthly budget -0.000
(0.000)
Big5: Openness -0.036
(0.026)
Big5: Extraversion -0.006
(0.030)
Big5: Nuroticism -0.013
(0.030)
Big5: Agreeableness -0.027
(0.031)
Big5: Conscientiousness 0.017
(0.029)
Observations 257 255
Notes: The table presents probit regressions using next week’s participations as the dependent
variable. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reported coecients
represent average marginal eects evaluated at sample means. Two subjects were excluded from
the analysis due to providing identical matching codes, while two subjects provided codes that
did not match with any of the rst week’s codes.
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Figure 2.3. Decision screen in Self-image and Social image treatment
Notes: Translated from German.
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Figure 2.4. The cubicle in Self-image and Social image treatment with a camera
attached to the computer screen
Notes: Video is turned o for demonstration purposes.
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Figure 2.5. Decision screen in Control treatment
Notes: Translated from German.
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3
The Inuence of Self and Social
Image Concerns on Lying ?
Joint with Armin Falk and Simone Quercia
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, a considerable amount of studies has shown that people expe-
rience psychological lying costs as they refrain from lying even when this in-
creases their payoff (e.g. Gneezy, 2005; Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi et al., 2011a;
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Abeler et al., 2014; Gächter and Schulz,
2016). While several explanations have been proposed to characterize lying
costs, recent papers show that combining a preference for being honest (intrin-
sic lying costs) with a preference for being seen as honest (reputation costs)
can reconcile the existing empirical findings (Abeler et al., 2016; Gneezy et al.,
2018; Khalmetski and Sliwka, 2017).1 While reputation costs, i.e., social image
? We thank Johannes Abeler, Stefania Bortolotti, Sebastian Kube, Daniele Nosenzo and
Matthias Praxmarer as well as workshop and conference participants at Lund University, Maas-
tricht University, University of East Anglia, Humboldt University and Vienna University of Eco-
nomics and Business for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support by Leib-
niz Programme of the German Science Foundation (DFG) and Institute on Behavior & Inequality
(briq).
1 We use the terminology used in Abeler et al. (2016); Gneezy et al. (2018) use the term direct
costs instead of intrinsic costs, while Khalmetski and Sliwka (2017) use the term fixed costs. Also,
for the reputation component, Gneezy et al. (2018) use the concept of social identity. While social
identity and reputation might not indicate the same constructs in general, in this context they
are both used to refer to the willingness to appear honest to external observers. One exception
to this modeling approach is M. Dufwenberg and M. A. Dufwenberg (2018), who assume that
people suffer only a reputation cost, but differently from the previous models this cost does not
depend on the probability of being seen as a liar by an external observer but on the inference
that the observer makes on the extent of the lie.
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costs arise from the person’s desire to appear honest in the eyes of others, the
underlying psychological motives for intrinsic costs are debated in the literature.
The most prevalent view is that these costs might originate from self-image con-
cerns, that is, the desire to think of oneself as an honest person (Mazar et al.,
2008; Shalvi et al., 2011a; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013).
In this paper, we investigate the influence of these two notions of image
concerns on lying behavior using the die-rolling paradigm introduced by Fis-
chbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). In this setup, subjects are given a six-sided
die, they are asked to roll it in private and to report the outcome to the ex-
perimenter. Payoffs are generally increasing in the report. While lies are not de-
tectable at the individual level, they can be inferred at the group level comparing
the distribution of reports with the expected distribution of die rolls.
To make self and social image concerns more salient, we exogenously ma-
nipulate self-awareness and observability, which direct the subjects’ focus on
their private and public self, respectively. To manipulate self-awareness we ex-
pose subjects to a real-time video of their face on the computer screen, i.e., we
expose them to their “self-image” as in Falk (2017). To manipulate observabil-
ity, we expose subjects to a real-time video of another subject sitting in the lab
while they take their decisions. This other subject also sees the decision maker’s
face and his or her computer screen in real time, but does not observe his or
her die-roll outcome. We compare these two treatments to a Control treatment
where subjects see a neutral pre-recorded video of another person.
We find that the increase of self-awareness has no significant effect on the av-
erage reported die-roll outcome. This suggests that self-image concerns may be
less important than previously hypothesized to explain lying behavior, and that
intrinsic lying costs might need to incorporate other psychological mechanisms.
On the other hand, we show that the increase of observability decreases the
average reported outcome even when information about the die-roll outcome
is held private. To complement this finding, we conduct a survey experiment
where we show that the likelihood of being perceived as a liar increases mono-
tonically with the reported outcome. Moreover, reporting higher outcomes ties
subjects with a stigma of likely having undesirable traits in several other dimen-
sions. This further suggests that our effect in the Social image treatment indeed
stems from the concerns that observers may draw adverse inferences from the
observation of high reports.
Our paper contributes to the literature on lying costs in several ways. In par-
ticular, numerous studies have suggested self-image or closely related concepts
as drivers of intrinsic lying costs. Most closely to our paper, Mazar et al. (2008)
investigate a tightly connected notion, one’s self-concept. They use religious re-
minders and honor codes to increase attention to moral standards, and sub-
sequently show that subjects behave more honestly. While using such priming
techniques might have its benefits, it has two main drawbacks. First, it primes
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everybody towards honest behavior by reminding people of specific moral stan-
dards. This, however, does not necessarily imply that these moral standards are
the ones congruent with individuals’ inner standards. Second, reminding about
moral standards might conflate individual with collective standards of behav-
ior.2 Furthermore, other studies have also hypothesized self-image concerns as
determinants of intrinsic lying costs, and have gathered indirect evidence. For
example, in their seminal study on the die-rolling paradigm, Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi (2013) find that reporting the second highest-paying outcome is
perceived as much less dishonest than reporting the highest-paying outcome.
The authors suggest that for the subjects that overreport partially, maintaining
a favorable self-image might be one of the driving motives. Another example is
Shalvi et al. (2011a) who manipulate the number of instructed die rolls, while
holding fixed as payoff relevant the first roll. They find that subjects lie more if
more die rolls are instructed, and argue that high reports are easier to justify to
oneself if observed in any die roll after the first.
In this paper, we design an exogenous manipulation where we increase the
salience of self-image concerns. In particular, our manipulation builds on the
recent work of Bénabou et al. (2018) which implies that self-image concerns
arise from the awareness of discrepancy between internal standards of behavior
and the self (e.g., in light of current behavior). To make self-image concerns
more salient, we manipulate one’s self-awareness, increasing the awareness of
the aforementioned discrepancy and, ceteris paribus, increasing self-image costs
when deviating from internal standards of behavior.3 This reasoning dates back
to the objective self-awareness theory (Duval andWicklund, 1972), which posits
that high levels of self-awareness induce behavior driven by salient moral stan-
dards. To test this theory, the most common manipulation has been to place a
mirror in front of the subjects during the decision phase. It was used to show that
increased self-awareness, for example, decreases simple transgressions (Beaman
et al., 1979), increases the attribution of causality for a specific consequence to
oneself (Duval and Wicklund, 1973), and induces the usage of corporal punish-
ment depending on the subject’s inner attitudes towards it (Carver, 1975).4
2 For this purpose, our design abstracts from reminding subjects of a specific set of morals, but
purely emphasizes the salience of inner standards, whatever they might be.
3 Theoretically this can be related to intrinsic lying costs under perfect information assuming
that the motive for this cost is to see oneself as honest (see, e.g., Abeler et al., 2016), or alter-
natively to imperfect information settings where the agent is assumed to forget his or her “type”
and makes inferences about it given the actions taken. This notion is suggested by M. Dufwenberg
and M. A. Dufwenberg (2018) as one possible interpretation of their model of lying costs and is
in line also with other more general models (e.g. Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, 2011; Bodner and
Prelec, 2003).
4 Note, however, that the mirror manipulation has several potential confounds that we circum-
vent using a camera manipulation and a specially designed Control treatment (see Section 3.2).
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Our Social image treatment connects to a large body of literature which
posits and shows that when being observed, people favor societal standards of
behavior (see Ariely et al., 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2012). More specifically, it
investigates the effect of increased observability on honesty, which to the best
of our knowledge, has been studied so far only in two instances in economics.
In particular, Abeler et al. (2016) and Gneezy et al. (2018), in order to test pre-
dictions from their theoretical models, design experiments similar to the stan-
dard die-rolling paradigm except that subjects see the outcome of a randomiz-
ing device on their screens. This allows the experimenter to map the observed
outcome to the report for each individual and observe lying behavior at the
individual level. Hence, these experiments increase observability by removing
private information vis-à-vis the experimenter.5 While this is reasonable in or-
der to test the above mentioned theories, it comes at a high cost. Specifically,
the usual purpose of lying is to deceive a receiver of the information about some
private information that the sender has. Thus, to deceive a receiver, some level
of uncertainty about the truth on his or her part is required. In contrast to the
previous studies, our aim is to investigate the effect of social image concerns in
such standard lying situations. Therefore, we maintain private information in
our paradigm, but make social image concerns more salient. We do so by keep-
ing the die-roll outcome private, and increasing the observability vis-à-vis the
observer, who is informed about the die roller’s report and can link the report
to his or her identity.
From the perspective of recent theoretical models, we interpret our manipu-
lation of observability as an exogenous increase in the individual parameter gov-
erning the reputational payoff, that is, how much subjects care about reputation.
This interpretation relies on several plausible observations: i) being exposed to
another observer beyond the experimenter may increase the social pressure on
the decision maker, ii) the fact that observers can tie the identity of decision mak-
ers with their reports may make reputational concerns stronger, and iii) other
student participants may constitute a more relevant audience than the experi-
menter for the decision makers, as this is the audience they would usually be
exposed to in everyday life. An increase in the reputation parameter predicts a
decrease in lying in models that do not allow downward lying (see Example 4
in M. Dufwenberg and M. A. Dufwenberg (2018) and Proposition 5 in Khalmet-
ski and Sliwka (2017)). Our results confirm this prediction and go in the same
direction as the full observability treatments in Abeler et al. (2016) and Gneezy
et al. (2018), but we observe a smaller effect than the ones they report (see
5 Some studies attempt to reduce observability vis-à-vis the experimenter by performing double-
blind procedures and manipulating probabilities of getting caught; however, they do not report a
significant impact on behavior (Mazar et al., 2008; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013).
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Section 3.4), suggesting that private information has indeed a crucial impact on
lying behavior.6
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we de-
scribe the experimental design and procedures. In Section 3.3, we report the
results of our study. In Section 3.4, we discuss the results and conclude.
3.2 Experimental design and procedure
Our experimental setup is closely based on the die-rolling paradigm introduced
by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Subjects were asked to roll a six-sided
die and report the outcome of the die roll on their computer. Depending on their
report they were able to earn any amount from 0 to 5 euros. The payoff is equal
to the reported outcome minus 1 euro, i.e., for a report of 1 subjects earned
0 euros, for a report of 2 subjects earned 1 euro, etc. As in Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi (2013) subjects were told to roll the die minimally twice, which
can facilitate lying; however, they were explicitly told to report the outcome of
the first die roll (for experimental instructions see Appendix 3.B). Subjects were
asked to roll the die in a non-transparent plastic cup. The cup ensured that only
they can observe the outcome which was visible only from directly above the
cup.7
We designed three different treatments: Self-image, Social image and Con-
trol treatment. In the Self-image treatment, we exogenously manipulated self-
awareness, a mediator of a person’s focus on his or her private self. In order to
increase self-awareness, we exposed the subjects to their own image. In particu-
lar, from the moment subjects sat in the cubicles, a camera installed on the top
of the monitor was capturing the image of their face, and playing it in real time
on their computer screen (see Figures 3.5 and 3.6 in Appendix). The camera
was positioned in a way that the subjects could not evade its visual field, but
also, that it was obvious that the plastic cup on the table was outside of this
visual field. Additionally, we used a software which automatically detected and
zoomed on subjects’ faces. The video was placed in the middle-upper part of
the screen, while the instructions and the decision screen were placed below it.
The subjects were fully informed that the video was not being recorded, and
that only they were able to see it. In order to give some meaning to the camera,
6 In the model by Abeler et al. (2016) that allows for downward lying, an increase in the
reputation parameter may have two counterbalancing effects. On the one hand, it makes high
reports more costly, and hence induces people to report lower numbers; on the other hand, there
will be less expected liars at the high reports and (potentially) more expected liars at the low
reports, which would make high reports become more attractive. In this framework, our data
would indicate that the first effect dominates the second because people report on average a
smaller outcome when they are observed.
7 The setup is similar as the die-under-cup paradigm by Shalvi et al. (2011b).
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subjects were also informed that they would answer a few short questions on
the camera technology and settings at the end of the experiment.
In the Social image treatment, we exogenously manipulated observability by
exposing subjects to the observation of other participants, i.e., observers. Upon
their arrival to the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned one of two roles,
decision makers or observers. Decision makers were facing identical procedures
and decisions as in Self-image treatment, but instead of viewing their face in the
video, they saw the face of their observer in real time. Observers were also seated
in private cubicles at the same time as the decision makers but had no decisions
tomake. Each observer was paired with one decisionmaker. Each observer saw i)
the video footage of their paired subject’s face in real time and ii) the decision
screen of their paired subject in real time. Hence, both the observer and the
paired subject saw each other, and additionally, the observer saw the decision
maker’s screen. This was common knowledge. The procedure made observers
fully aware of the reported outcome but not of the actual die outcome. At the
end of the decision making part, observers left the laboratory before decision
makers. This was publicly announced at the beginning of the study. Alongside
the questionnaires from Self-image treatment, decisionmakers were also asked if
they have ever seen their observer before, and if so, what was their relationship
with them. Only one subject indicated knowing the paired observer. Removing
this subject from the data does not change our results.
We compare the decisions in Self-image and Social image to a Control treat-
ment. To design a comparable Control treatment we address two concerns. First,
the subjects in both of our treatments were exposed to a video. If such a distrac-
tion drains cognitive resources, then subjects could be more inclined to act affec-
tively, following their automatic response and potentially biasing the results.8
Second, in both treatments subjects saw a person who is looking at them: the
observer in Social image treatment, and themselves in Self-image treatment. Sev-
eral studies have shown that being exposed to simple social cues such as a pair
of observing eyes can influence one’s behavior (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bate-
son et al., 2006; Rigdon et al., 2009).9 To address these two issues, Control
8 Dishonest behavior has been considered a cognitively demanding process linked to brain ar-
eas responsible for cognitive control (Sip et al., 2008; Greene and Paxton, 2009). On the one
hand, studies show that when cognitive control is low due to cognitive depletion, people’s auto-
matic response is to act more selfishly (Achtziger et al., 2015), and more dishonestly (Gino et al.,
2011), which could bias our results upwards. On the other hand, other studies suggest that peo-
ple’s automatic response is to behave more prosocially (Rand et al., 2012; Schulz et al., 2014). If
subjects care about how much money the experimenter is left with, or if prosociality as a positive
trait is connected to honesty, this could bias our results downwards.
9 Note, however, that several studies fail to find an effect of social cues in different settings
(Fehr and Schneider, 2010; Lamba and Mace, 2010), and question the validity of previous evi-
dence (Carbon and Hesslinger, 2011).
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treatment is identical to Self-image and Social image treatment, except for the
following: Instead of seeing their own face or the observer’s face, the subjects
saw a mute video footage of a famous German news presenter (see Figure 3.7
in Appendix). As the context of the video was immediately recognizable, the
subjects were perfectly aware that the video was prerecorded. Moreover, the
news presenter is a public person working for a mainstream public-service, and
as such does not trigger any tendentious associations.10
The lying task lasted less than 10 minutes; hence, it was run right after
another experiment, in line with Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). In the
experiment preceding the lying task, subjects were participating in another eco-
nomic game and were exposed to the identical treatment manipulations as in
the subsequent die-rolling experiment.11 This means that the same manipula-
tions were present from the moment subjects entered the cubicles until reaching
the short questionnaire at the end of the session. Hence, the attached cameras
were not abruptly turned on when reaching the lying task, and their function
was clear from the beginning of the session. A total of 685 subjects participated
in the study (59.7% female), out of which 531 subjects participated as decision
makers and 154 as observers. In Social image treatment, the observers earned
8 euros each for their participation in the entire session. Decision makers were
not informed about the payment of observers to avoid influences on their be-
havior driven by social comparison such as, e.g., inequity considerations (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999). Subjects were primarily students of the University of Bonn
and were recruited with hroot (Bock et al., 2014). Sessions were conducted at
the BonnEconLab. The experiment was programmed using Z-Tree experimental
software (Fischbacher, 2007).
In addition to our main experiment, we report results from a short survey
which was ran on a separate set of 100 subjects. The survey aims to comple-
ment our Social image treatment findings by exploring whether people i) per-
ceive that higher reports are more likely to be a product of a lie, and ii) attribute
negative traits to subjects who report high numbers. The questions are highly
relevant in understanding potential reputation effects which can come from re-
ports. Specifically, given that we maintain private information in our paradigm,
it is necessary to see whether reports alone can send undesirable signals about
10 Comparing Self or Social image treatment with the Control treatment ensures that any dif-
ference can be interpreted as the effect of increased self-awareness or reputation, respectively, as
any potential effects of social cues or cognitive depletion would be present in all three treatments.
Notice, furthermore, that Falk (2017) uses an identical control treatment in an investigation of
self-image concerns for moral behavior and compares it with a control treatment without any
video, finding no difference between the two.
11 In the preceding experiment, subjects played a dictator game (see Bašić et al., 2018). We
report robustness checks in Appendix 3.A showing that spillover effects cannot account for our
findings.
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a die-roller. Upon accepting to participate in the survey, subjects were shortly
informed about the die-rolling paradigm. Then, they were asked to evaluate the
probability of a subject being a liar conditional on each of the six reports. More-
over, for hypothetical reports they were confronted with 6 different statements.
For each of the statements they had to indicate howmuch they agree with it on a
scale from 0 to 7. The statements were: “I find this person trustworthy”, “I would
take this person in a shared flat”, “I would lend money to this person”, “I would
employ this person”, “I would buy a car from this person” and “I would vote
for this person”. The hypothetical reports differed within-subject across the six
statements, and the order of the hypothetical reports was randomized between-
subject. The survey was conducted with students in front of the University of
Bonn library and canteen. Each participant earned 5 euros for participation.
3.3 Results
We divide our results section in two subsections. In the first, we report the com-
parison between the Control and the Self-image treatment. In the second, we
contrast the results of the Control and the Social image treatment, and comple-
ment this comparison with the results of our survey experiment.
3.3.1 The inuence of self-image
In this subsection, we focus on the difference between the Control (n = 188)
and the Self-image treatment (n= 189). First, we check if people overreport the
outcome of die rolling. To do that, we contrast the reports of the die rolls with
the uniform distribution by applying the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for discrete
data (henceforth KS d; Jann, 2008). In Figure 3.1 we report the frequency of
each reported outcome (left panel) and the average reported outcome (right
panel) in the two treatments. We find that the distribution of reports is signif-
icantly different from the uniform distribution in both treatments (two-sided
KS d test, p < 0.001 for both treatments). Next, we compare average reports
between the two treatments. Figure 3.1 (right panel) shows that people report
on average 4.62 in Self-image treatment and 4.70 in Control treatment with no
significant differences across the two (two-sided t-test, p = 0.630). The result
remains insignificant if we perform the analysis using an OLS regression and
including control variables (see Table 3.1 in the following subsection). Next, we
compare the distributions between the two treatments (Figure 3.1, left panel).
Also in this case, we do not find any significant difference (Fisher’s exact test,
p = 0.310; Epps-Singleton two-sample test, p = 0.270).
Finally, we turn to the analysis of report frequencies for each possible out-
come. We observe that in both Control and Self-image treatment people over-
report the outcome 5 (two-sided binomial test against the expected true value
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Figure 3.1. Frequencies of each reported outcome (left panel) and the average reported
outcome (right panel) in Self-image and Control treatment
Notes: Error bars indicate standard error of the means. The dashed line represents the expected
frequency of each outcome (left panel) and the expected average outcome (right panel).
of 0.167, p < 0.001 for Control treatment, p = 0.097 for Self-image treatment)
and the outcome 6 (two-sided binomial test against the expected true value
of 0.167, p < 0.001 for both treatments). If we compare the two distributions,
we observe that the frequencies of all outcomes are very similar across the two
treatments. Only the frequencies for outcomes 4 and 5 exhibit a noticeable dif-
ference across treatments; however, this difference is not statistically significant
(two-sided binomial test of proportions, p = 0.154 for outcome 4, p = 0.183 for
outcome 5).
Overall, higher self-awareness and emphasized self-image concerns induce
neither a significant difference in the average reported outcome nor a significant
difference in the distributions of the reports or the report frequencies of any
specific outcome.
3.3.2 The inuence of social image
In this subsection, we analyze the difference between the Control (n = 188)
and the Social image treatment (n = 154). In Figure 3.2 we report the fre-
quency of each reported outcome (left panel) and the average reported out-
come (right panel) in the two treatments. First of all and similar to Control and
Self-image treatment, subjects in Social image treatment significantly overreport
their die-roll outcome compared to the uniform distribution (two-sided KS d
test, p < 0.001). However, as seen in Figure 3.2 (right panel), people on aver-
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age report less in Social image (4.34) than they do in Control treatment (4.70).
This difference is statistically significant (two-sided t-test, p = 0.038). When
comparing observed distributions (Figure 3.2, left panel), we do not find a sig-
nificant difference (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.351; Epps-Singleton two-sample
test, p = 0.344).
Figure 3.2. Frequencies of each reported outcome (left panel) and the average reported
outcome (right panel) in Social image and Control treatment
Notes: Error bars indicate standard error of the means. The dashed line represents the expected
frequency of each outcome (left panel) and the expected average outcome (right panel).
Next, we focus on the reports for each possible outcome. Similarly to Control
treatment, we observe that subjects in Social image treatment overreport the
outcome 5 and the outcome 6 (two-sided binomial test against the expected
true value of 0.167, p = 0.025 for outcome 5, p < 0.001 for outcome 6). When
comparing all 6 possible outcomes across the two treatments, we observe that
the percentage of all reported outcomes is closer to the expected true value in
Social image than in Control treatment, which can explain the observed shift of
the average reported outcome. However, these changes in report frequencies are
rather small, and most outcomes in Social image treatment are not significantly
different from Control treatment (two-sided binomial test of two proportions,
p > 0.196 for outcomes 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, p = 0.082 for the outcome 2).
Next, in Table 3.1 we report an OLS regression analysis to confirm the ro-
bustness of our findings in Self-image and Social image treatment to further
controls.12 We report 3 regression models where we use the reported outcome
12 The results stay very similar when using ordered probit estimations.
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Table 3.1. OLS regressions estimates of treatment eects
Variables Dependent variable:
reported outcome
(1) (2) (3)
Self-image -0.072 -0.069 -0.054
(0.150) (0.148) (0.149)
Social image -0.353** -0.346** -0.309*
(0.171) (0.169) (0.168)
Female (=1) -0.516*** -0.371**
(0.130) (0.150)
Age -0.002
(0.015)
Monthly budget 0.000
(0.000)
Big5: Extraversion 0.216***
(0.075)
Big5: Agreeableness -0.257***
(0.072)
Big5: Neuroticism 0.039
(0.081)
Big5: Conscientiousness -0.048
(0.071)
Big5: Openness 0.026
(0.069)
Constant 4.697*** 5.001*** 4.875***
(0.108) (0.128) (0.364)
Observations 531 531 529
R-squared 0.009 0.037 0.069
Notes: The table presents OLS regressions using reported outcome as the dependent variable. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
as dependent variable and two treatment dummies (with Control treatment as
omitted category). Model (1) reports these estimates without controls and con-
firms the results from non-parametric tests. Model (2) indicates that these find-
ings are robust when controlling for gender. Model (3) shows the same results
also controlling for age, monthly budget and personality characteristics (Social
image treatment remains significant at a 10% level; p = 0.067). In addition, we
also show that females report less than males in the overall sample replicating
a standard finding in the die-roll experiments (see Abeler et al., 2016). Fur-
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thermore, we observe that reports increase with extraversion and decrease with
agreeableness.
Figure 3.3. Survey results
Notes: The average of the expected probability that the subject is lying conditioning on the re-
ported outcome (left panel), and the average agreement with the statement conditioning on the
reported outcome (right panel). The statements are “I nd this person trustworthy”, “I would take
this person in a shared at”, “I would lend money to this person”, “I would employ this person”, “I
would buy a car from this person” and “I would vote for this person”.
Finally, we report the results of the survey conducted on uninvolved subjects
(n = 100) to complement our social image results. In Figure 3.3 we report the
average of the expected probability that a subject is a liar conditional on the
report (left panel), and the average agreement with the statements conditional
on the subject’s report (right panel). The average belief about the probability
that subject is a liar increases with the report (OLS regression with standard
errors clustered at the individual level, p < 0.001). In particular, we observe
a monotonic increase of beliefs ranging from 6% to 55%. With respect to the
agreement with the statements, we observe that on average, survey participants
perceive a person reporting higher numbers as less trustworthy, and they declare
to be less willing to consider such a person as a flatmate, to lend them money,
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employ them, buy a car from them or vote for them (Spearman’s rho, p = 0.004
for “Flatmate” comparison, p < 0.001 for all other comparisons).
To sum up, we observe that increased observability decreases the average re-
ported outcome. Furthermore, we observe that reporting higher numbers signals
higher likelihood of being a liar, and higher likelihood of being untrustworthy
and having undesirable traits in many other domains. This further supports the
reputation channel as the explanation behind the results of our social image
manipulation. Specifically, on average, the observer who sees a high report in
contrast to a low report will think that the die roller is more likely to be a liar and
more likely to have undesirable traits. This, in turn, gives rise to reputation costs
for the die roller, and can explain why the die roller can benefit from reporting
a lower number.
3.4 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the influence of self and social image con-
cerns on lying behavior. We have exogenously manipulated self-awareness and
observability by exposing subjects to their own image or to the observation of
another participant in real time, respectively. We have shown that the increase
of self-awareness through our manipulation has no effect on the average report.
There are several reasons why this may be the case. One possibility is that the
importance of self-image concerns might be very low in certain domains. Falk
(2017) uses a similar self-image manipulation as ours, and shows that subjects
care about their self-image when confronted with the choice of administering an
electric shock to another individual for money. Moreover, using an identical ma-
nipulation, Bašić et al. (2018) find that increasing self-awareness significantly
increases generosity. Hence, it could potentially be that honesty is not a (salient)
inner standard, and the act of lying has a negligible impact on one’s self image.
Alternatively, self-image concerns could be an important determinant of lying
and cheating behaviors; but in the die-rolling task, where the only “victim” of
immoral behavior is the experimenter, and the negative externality is arguably
weaker than when administering an electric shock or being selfish to another
participant, the strength of self-image concerns could be insufficient to generate
a significant shift in behavior. Hence, it would be important to study self-image
concerns in settings where the externality of lies is more pronounced as for ex-
ample sender-receiver games (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Gneezy, 2005).13
13 Additionally, it is possible that for a certain proportion of subjects, their inner standard is self-
interest and not honesty, which could in turn explain why the average report does not change
in our self-image manipulation. This explanation, however, is not consistent with standard con-
ceptualizations of self-image concerns (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Bénabou et al., 2018).
Moreover, with such polarization of inner standards, we would also expect a polarization of re-
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The lack of self-image effect might suggest that there could be other psy-
chological mechanisms that lie at the origin of intrinsic lying costs in die-rolling
experiments.14 While several motives have already been proposed, e.g., social
norms and guilt aversion, it was recently shown that these motives cannot recon-
cile all the findings from previous die-rolling experiments (Abeler et al., 2016).
One potential explanation is that honesty could have components of heuristical
behavior, that is, subjects display automatic honest behaviors that have been in-
stilled by parents and/or other authority figures (see Bénabou et al., 2018), and
do not question these behaviors even if characteristics of the decision environ-
ment change. Alternatively, in line with M. Dufwenberg and M. A. Dufwenberg
(2018) subjects could have no intrinsic lying costs but reputational concerns vis-
à-vis an external audience with respect to the size of their lies. M. Dufwenberg
and M. A. Dufwenberg (2018) show that their model can generate a distribution
of reports in line with a standard die-rolling experiment in the case where the
only audience is the experimenter.
With respect to social image concerns, we have shown that the increase in
subjects’ observability significantly decreases the average report, and that report-
ing high paying numbers ties subjects with a stigma of likely being a liar and
having undesirable traits. The results cleanly indicate that reputation constitutes
an important component of lying costs. Different from previous literature, how-
ever, we have reported a manipulation that keeps information about the true
outcome of the die roll private, and hence maintains the private-information
property of standard lying situations. The direction of our effect confirms theo-
ries that predict a decrease in lying due to increased reputational concerns (M.
Dufwenberg and M. A. Dufwenberg, 2018; Khalmetski and Sliwka, 2017). As
we have noted, we find a smaller effect compared to the effects found when the
outcome of a randomizing device is public. In particular, we observe a Cohen’s
d effect size of 0.226, while Abeler et al. (2016) observe an effect size of 0.761
and Gneezy et al. (2018) of 0.284. This suggests that private information has
indeed an important impact on lying behavior.
ports in the Self-image treatment, which is not supported by our data. Finally, it is also possible
that subjects’ self-awareness in the die-rolling paradigm is rather high in the Control treatment;
hence, manipulating it cannot provoke a sufficient further increase. This, however, is at odds with
studies that also use the camera manipulation and find an effect of self-awareness using different
games, which would imply that the level of self-awareness would need to be highly context spe-
cific: higher in the die-rolling paradigm than in a morality paradigm (Falk, 2017) or a dictator
game (Bašić et al., 2018).
14 Note that the existence of intrinsic lying costs was identified in the die-rolling paradigm
(Abeler et al., 2016; Gneezy et al., 2018; Khalmetski and Sliwka, 2017).
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Appendix 3.A Robustness check
In line with Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), due to the brevity of the lying
task we conducted it after another experiment. In this other experiment subjects
played a dictator game. Given that they were exposed to the same manipulation
in the dictator game and the lying game, this raises concerns for potential asym-
metric spillover effects. In particular, both self and social image manipulations
increased generous behavior in the dictator game (see Bašić et al., 2018); hence,
this could have encouraged self-licensing, i.e., a subject acts generously in the
dictator game, but then this behavior licenses the subject to subsequently lie in
the lying task (see Khan and Dhar, 2006; Mazar and Zhong, 2010).15 We test
for this potential concern in two steps. First, we check if in any of the three treat-
ments there is a positive correlation between the dictator giving and the report
in the subsequent lying game. Such a result would indicate strong evidence for
licensing. We do not find such an effect in any of the three treatments (Spear-
man’s rho < –0.21, p < 0.004 for all three treatments). The negative correlation
we observe indicates that across all three treatments, on average, subjects that
give more in the dictator game also report less in the lying game, suggesting
a stable preference for acting in a moral manner across the two games. Sec-
ond, we test if increased self-awareness or observability causes different lying
behavior across subjects that exhibit similar generosity in the dictator game. In
particular, it could be that even if subjects are acting in a moral manner across
games, they engage in subtle licensing, where due to more generous behavior
in the two image treatments, subjects are encouraged to report slightly more
than subjects that exhibit similar generosity in the Control treatment. To inves-
tigate this on a detailed level, we divide our sample in categories according to
their behavior in the dictator game. We observe that the majority of our subjects
(98.49%) fit into one of the three categories: 42.37% of subjects give 0% of their
endowment, 39.55% give between 0% and 50%, and 16.57% of subjects give
50%.16 We test the difference in reports from the lying task for each of the three
categories across Control and Self-image treatment, and Control and Social im-
age treatment and find no significant effects (two-sided t-test, p > 0.227 for all
six comparisons). Hence, altogether, we do not find any evidence that spillovers
from previous experiment can account for the differences in lying behavior, or
lack thereof, across treatments.
15 Note that we observe an effect in the social image manipulation; hence, regarding social
image, moral licensing could only cause an underestimation of the effect size as it would motivate
subjects to lie more.
16 This distribution of behavior is in line with other studies (see Engel, 2011).
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Appendix 3.B Experimental instructions
The following section contains experimental instructions translated from Ger-
man.
3.B.1 Dictator: Control, Self-image and Social image treatment
The general instructions and the instructions for the first game were printed and left
in front of subjects’ computer screens before they entered the lab. At the beginning
of the experiment, the instructions were read out loud by one of the experimenters.
Welcome to this study!
You are participating in an economic study. Depending on your answers, you
can earn a certain amount of money. The money will be paid out at the end of
the study in cash. It is, therefore, very important that you read the instructions
carefully, and that you understand them.
Only for Control treatment. As you can see, there is a video playing on your
computer screen. This video will also be played during the study.
Only for Self-image treatment. As you can see, there is a camera installed on
the computer screen. The image that the camera is capturing is shown on your
computer screen in real time. Please note: No video streams are saved, and
only you and no other person can see your camera video. At the end of the
study we will ask you several short questions about the camera technology and
camera settings.
Only for Social image treatment. As you can see, there is a camera installed
on the computer screen. You can see another participant of the study. Simultane-
ously, the participant can also see you. It is strictly forbidden to communicate
in any way with this other participant, e.g, through waving, signs, facial
expressions, or similar. This other participant has the role of observer. Your ob-
server has received his own instructions, in which his task is clearly explained.
He has only one task, and that is to observe you and your decisions. Your observer
sees your computer screen in real time. That means that all the movements that
you do with your mouse, and all the decisions that you take during this study,
will be seen by your observer. Please note that there can be short delays in the
transmission of the camera video. The transmission of your screen and mouse
movements occurs with no delay. Please note: No video streams are saved,
only your observer and no other person can see your camera video. If you
disagree with this, you can finish your participation on the study now. At the
end of the study we will ask you several short questions about the camera tech-
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nology and camera settings. After the end of the study, your observer will leave
the laboratory before you.
All statementsmade in these instructions are true. This holds generally for all
studies conducted at the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research,
and also for this study.
During the study, communication between participants is forbidden. If
you have questions, then please direct them only to us. Please, raise your hand
and a member of the experimental team will come to answer privately. Violating
this rule leads to exclusion from the study.
At this point, the experimenter read the instructions of the first game, which
was followed by the game itself. After the game, we presented the subjects with the
instructions of the die-rolling experiment on their computer screens.
Die roll, introductory screen. The first part of the study is now finished. The
second part of the study is not connected to the first. For the following task you
will require a cup and a die. Please wait, until we bring it to you.
At this point, the subjects were each given a plastic non-transparent cup and a
die.
Die roll, instructions screen. Please, do not use the die nor the cup before you
are asked to do so. When you will be asked to roll the die, roll it twice. More
specifically, take it with your hand and roll it in the cup. Your task it to report
which number you rolled with the first try. Depending on the reported number,
you will receive a certain amount of money. How much money you earn for a
given number is presented in the table underneath (see Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4. Payment table
The second roll is to assure yourself that the die is not loaded. You can roll
the die also more than twice; however, only the first roll counts. The money that
you earn in this task will be added to the money you earned so far and paid out
at the end of the study in cash.
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One more time: When you are asked to roll the die, roll it twice. Report the
number that you rolled with the first try. The amount of money you will earn
depending on your report is presented in the table.
Please, do not start yet. If you understood everything, press “next”. If
you have questions, raise your hand.
Die roll, decision screen. Roll the die twice now. Report which number you
rolled with the first try.
3.B.2 Observer
The instructions were printed and left in front of subjects’ computer screens before
they entered the lab.
READ IMMEDIATELY
Welcome to this study!
Important: It is strictly forbidden to communicate with the participant
that you see in the video in any way, e.g., through waving, signs, facial
expressions, or similar.
In this study you are participating in a role of observer. Your only have one
task, and that is to observe another participant of the study. For this task, you
will receive a payment of 8 euros in cash at the end of the study.
On your screen you can see a video of another participant and his decision
screen in real time. That means that you will observe the decisions that this
participant takes during the study. At the same time, this participant can also
see you through the camera that is installed on your computer screen. Please
note: No video streams are saved. Except for the participant that you see,
no other person can see the video from your camera.
During the study, communication between participants is forbidden. If
you have questions, direct them to us. Raise your hand, and a member of the
experimental team will come to answer privately. If you violate this rule, you
will be excluded from the study.
The instructions that will be read out loud at the beginning of the study are
for the subjects that will take decisions. That means, they are intended for the
participant that you are observing. Listen carefully, so that you can understand
what is the task of this participant.
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Appendix 3.C Additional gures
Figure 3.5. Decision screen in Self-image and Social image treatment
Notes: Translated from German.
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Figure 3.6. The cubicle in Self-image and Social image treatment with a camera
attached to the computer screen
Notes: The video is turned o for demonstration purposes.
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Figure 3.7. Decision screen in Control treatment
Notes: Translated from German.
4The Inuence of Self and Social
Image Concerns in Childhood and
Adolescence ?
Joint with Armin Falk and Simone Quercia
4.1 Introduction
Prosocial behavior is ubiquitous in nature. It is critical for a variety of societal
functions and outcomes, ranging from charitable giving and volunteering to
trade and economic growth (Zak and Knack, 2001; Guiso et al., 2009; Carpenter
and Myers, 2010; DellaVigna et al., 2012). Given the importance of prosocial
behavior, a large literature is dedicated to understanding its underlying drivers.
Recently, a significant amount of both theoretical and empirical work shifted fo-
cus towards image concerns. Image concerns refer to an individual’s desire to
create and uphold a positive image of him- or herself; self-image concerns refer
to the desire to uphold a positive image in the eyes of oneself, while social image
concerns, i.e., reputation concerns, refer to the desire to uphold a positive image
in the eyes of others. Both were shown to causally influence prosocial behavior
(Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Ariely et al., 2009; Grossman and van der Weele,
2017; Falk, 2017), and are considered as its critical components. While lots of
studies focus on the effect of self and social image concerns in adults, very lit-
tle is known about their roots in young age. This is of particular interest, as i)
? We thank the headmasters of schools and the parents of children for allowing us to perform
the research as well as AnaMilić, Antonija Nikolaš, Nikolina Oršićek, Sanja Petrić and Arina Veseli
for excellent research support. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Institute
on Behavior and Inequality (briq).
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it can shed light on the origins of self and social image concerns, ii) it can un-
cover the roots of the commonly observed gender asymmetry in image concerns,
which supports evolutionary theories suggesting that men are more inclined to
costly signal prosocial traits (see Trivers, 1972; Amotz Zahavi and Avishag Za-
havi, 1999; E. A. Smith and Bird, 2000; Raihani and S. Smith, 2015), and iii)
it can illuminate the role of image concerns as an underpinning mechanism of
prosocial behavior in children and adolescents.
In this study we investigate the influence of self and social image concerns
on prosocial behavior in 7-14 year-old children and adolescents. We do so by
implementing a dictator game with 494 subjects, where we exogenously ma-
nipulate self-awareness and observability in order to direct the subjects’ focus
on their private and public self, respectively. We show that both self and social
image concerns matter, however, only for boys. More specifically, we show that:
i) boys increase their giving with the increase of social image concerns, signifi-
cantly more so than girls (who do not react), ii) boys increase their giving with
the increase of self-image concerns, while girls do not, and iii) the opinion about
fairest behavior, together with the perceived fairness of a selfish behavior does
not vary across genders, suggesting that the behavioral gender asymmetry is
not due to differences in understanding of normative behavior, but due to an
actual difference in preferences for being viewed as prosocial. Our results sup-
port recent predictions suggesting that reputation should start playing a role at
the age of 7-10 (Warneken, 2018). Interestingly, the image effects we observe
diminish with older children, which is driven by an increase of giving in the
Control treatment but a lack of increase in the two image treatments, over age.
Specifically, giving in older children comes close to what they think is fair behav-
ior, suggesting that image concerns might be able to increase prosocial behavior
as long as inner prosocial preferences are sufficiently weak and leave scope for
an increase. Finally, the stark gender findings we observe support evolutionary
theories implying that men have a higher benefit of signaling prosocial traits
(see Trivers, 1972; Amotz Zahavi and Avishag Zahavi, 1999; E. A. Smith and
Bird, 2000; Raihani and S. Smith, 2015), and show that this important gender
difference emerges very early in human development.
Our results connect and contribute to several streams of literature. First and
foremost, they connect to the literature on image concerns and prosocial behav-
ior in adults. The theoretical models of image concerns propose that people are
willing to costly signal to others and to themselves that they possess prosocial
traits, in order to maintain a positive social and self-image, respectively (see
Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Bénabou et al., 2018). Regarding social image con-
cerns, it has been shown that an increase in one’s observability increases gener-
ous and cooperative behavior, robustly confirming that people care about their
prosocial reputation (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Ariely et al., 2009; Andreoni
and Bernheim, 2009; Böhm and Regner, 2013; Bašić et al., 2018). Regarding
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self-image concerns, the literature is more recent, nevertheless, the evidence is
ample. Several studies use the willful ignorance paradigm, where subjects have
the opportunity of increasing their payoff while potentially imposing a low pay-
off to another subject, but can choose to stay ignorant about the consequences
to the other’s payoff. It was shown that subjects become more selfish when they
can stay ignorant, indicating that subjects avoid negative self-updating and try
to maintain a positive self-image (Dana et al., 2007; Grossman, 2014; Grossman
and van derWeele, 2017). More recently, Falk (2017) and Bašić et al. (2018) use
an exogenous manipulation of self-image concerns where they increase the self-
awareness of subjects and show that people start acting more morally and more
generously, respectively. We add to this literature, as we shed light on the roots
of these two fundamental drivers of prosocial behavior. So far, only a few stud-
ies investigate related questions with children. Engelmann et al. (2012) show
that 5 year-old children steal less when being observed by another child, but
find only weak evidence that observation influences their willingness to help.
In another study, costly sharing was found to be influenced by an observer at
the age of 5, but only when the observer was also able to give some resources
to the decision maker immediately after the sharing decision (Engelmann et al.,
2013). Although it was speculated that caring about one’s reputation should be-
come relevant at the age of 7-10, the evidence for this is still missing (Warneken,
2018).1 We contribute to this important question with our experiment. We find
only weak evidence that image concerns matter when we look at our entire
subject pool, but find strong evidence that they affect boys and not girls, and es-
pecially strong evidence when we look at the 7-10 year-old boys. Their age is in
line with the prediction of Warneken (2018). Moreover, given the strong gender
difference, the finding gives important insights to the interdisciplinary literature
on asymmetric gender effects of costly signaling (Trivers, 1972; Amotz Zahavi
and Avishag Zahavi, 1999; E. A. Smith and Bird, 2000; Böhm and Regner, 2013;
Van Vugt and Iredale, 2013; Raihani and S. Smith, 2015).
The most prominent explanation why men should be more inclined to signal
prosocial traits relies on sexual selection theory which implies that women bear
higher minimal parental investments (see Trivers, 1972), and hence are more
selective when finding a mate. Given that a costly prosocial action can signal i)
one’s quality in possessing wealth, and ii) the willingness to share that wealth,
or simply, one’s propensity to care about others (see Amotz Zahavi and Avishag
1 Warneken (2018) argues that behavior driven by concerns for reputation involves several
complex processes. It requires higher-level social-cognitive reasoning and, likely, much experi-
ence, implying it should not play an effect in early childhood. Importantly, children need to under-
stand what type of opinion others form of them, which coincides with understanding impression
management, a process where people try to influence the perceptions of others. This reasoning
seems to develop roughly in the period from 7 to 10 years of age (Aloise-Young, 1993; Banerjee,
2002; Hill and Pillow, 2006).
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Zahavi, 1999; E. A. Smith and Bird, 2000), evolution arguably favored men to
be more likely to signal these qualities as a mating strategy. This proposition
found support in adults, as it was shown that in public settings, men increase
their costly prosocial behavior more than women (Böhm and Regner, 2013),2
and the increase is driven by men trying to impress attractive women (Van Vugt
and Iredale, 2013; Raihani and S. Smith, 2015). Our findings contribute to this
literature by shedding light on the roots of this gender asymmetry. In line with
the predictions, we find that boys react to increased observability more than
girls (who do not react), and offer evidence that the roots of this gender dif-
ference lie early in human development. We also offer suggestive evidence that
this difference cannot be explained by a gender difference in understanding of
normative behavior, but it appears to be a true difference in preference for ap-
pearing prosocial. Interestingly, a similar gender pattern can be observed in our
Self-image treatment, where we find that only boys become more generous. This
is in line with the findings of Bašić et al. (2018), who show that when exposed
to increased self-awareness, only adult men exhibit stronger generosity in a dic-
tator game, while women do not. We discuss the potential mechanism behind
the self-image gender asymmetry in the Discussion and conclusion section (4.4).
Finally, our study also connects to the more general literature on development
of prosocial behavior. One of the most common findings in the literature is that
children become more prosocial as they get older (Harbaugh et al., 2003; Be-
nenson et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008, 2013; Bauer et al., 2014; Kosse et al.,
forthcoming). We replicate this finding in our Control treatment, as we observe
that children become more generous with age.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we de-
scribe the experimental design and procedure. In Section 4.3, we report the
results of our study. In Section 4.4, we discuss and conclude the paper.
4.2 Experimental design and procedure
We divide the following section into two subsections. In the first subsection,
we explain the experimental design. In the second subsection, we describe the
experimental procedure and the subject pool.
4.2.1 Experimental design
To study prosocial behavior we focus on generosity, a fundamental facet of hu-
man prosociality. For this purpose, subjects played a dictator game, first in a role
of a dictator, and then in a role of a recipient, where they were matched to a
different person. They were informed about the second game only after the first
2 Bašić et al. (2018) find a similar but insignificant pattern.
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one.3 As dictators, subjects had to divide 10 tokens between themselves and
their paired recipient who was another student of their own age. Each token in
the dictator game was worth a certain amount of Croatian kunas.
Subjects made their decisions on computers. Given their young age, to en-
sure comprehension, the verbal instructions were given in one-to-one sessions
with an experimenter (for experimental instructions see Appendix 4.B). Follow-
ing the dictator game, subjects participated in a short cognitive ability test. To
obtain a quick and precise measure of cognitive ability, we implemented the sym-
bol correspondence test (Dohmen et al., 2010). Subjects were confronted with 9
unfamiliar symbols, each paired to a different digit, from 1 to 9. The pairing was
presented in a table at the top of the screen. Their task was to input the correct
digit as the symbol would appear on the screen. After each input a new symbol
would appear. They had 90 seconds to input as many correct digits as possible.
After the test, the subjects were asked about basic socio-demographics, pocket
allowance, and whether they had heard about the content of the experiment be-
fore. Moreover, they were given experimentally-validated survey questions for
eliciting time preferences (Falk et al. (2016), see Appendix 4.A for a detailed
description). Before they left the experimental session they were explicitly in-
structed not to talk about the study with students who had not yet participated.
We designed three different treatments. In the Self-image treatment, we ex-
ogenously manipulated self-awareness, raising attention to the congruency of
inner standards of behavior and one’s current behavior, and consequently, in-
creasing the salience of self-image concerns.4 In order to increase self-awareness,
we exposed the subjects to their own “self-image” as in Falk (2017). In partic-
ular, from the moment subjects sat in front of the computer, they were facing
a real-time video of their face, which was captured by a camera on the top of
their computer screen. The camera was positioned in a way that subjects could
not evade its visual field. The video was prominently placed in the middle-upper
part of their computer screen, while the decision options were placed bellow it
(see Figure 4.2 in Appendix). As the subjects sat at their computer, their experi-
3 In order to ensure a clean comparison of behavior across age, we informed the dictators
that they participated in a second dictator game as recipients after the first game, during the
payoff procedure. Otherwise, children might form expectations about what they will receive from
dictators, and the capabilities for such a cognitively complex reasoning might vary across age,
giving rise to a potential confound. Even more, if children have correct expectations about what
they could receive, the expectations would increase with age as older dictators are more generous.
Together with the information about being a recipient, during the payoff, subjects were again
informed about the rules of the game and were told their paired dictator’s decision. Subjects
were informed that they were not matched to the same person as when they played in the role
of a dictator.
4 For the concept of self-awareness see objective self-awareness theory (Duval and Wicklund,
1972), and empirical studies supporting it (Duval and Wicklund, 1973; Carver, 1975; Diener and
Wallbom, 1976; Duval et al., 1979; Beaman et al., 1979).
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menters explained that the video was not being recorded. The video was turned
off immediately after the dictator game.
In the Social image treatment, we exogenously manipulated observability by
exposing participants to the observation of another subject, i.e., their observer,
as in Bašić et al. (2018). The dictators in Social image treatment were facing
the same procedures and decision as in Self-image, but instead of seeing their
face in the video, they saw their observer’s face. The observers were dictators’
classmates who were seated in front of another computer. Observers saw i) the
video footage of their paired dictator’s face in real time, and ii) his or her de-
cision screen in real time. Hence, both the observer and the dictator saw each
other, and additionally, the observer saw the dictator’s decision screen. The ob-
servers had only one task during the dictator game, to observe the actions of
their paired dictator. The observers also received instructions about the rules of
the dictator game by their own experimenter. All these details were common
knowledge. Both dictators and observers were informed that the video is not
being recorded. Moreover, they were instructed that any type of communication
through the video was strictly forbidden. Together with their task to observe the
dictator, observers also answered the following questions: i) “what do you think
is fair - how many tokens should the student whom you see on the screen give
to the other student”, and ii) “if the student whom you see on the screen gave
2 tokens to the other student, how fair would it be”. They answered the latter
question using a 5 point likert scale ranging from “very unfair” to “very fair”.
We use the two questions as proxies for i) children’s understanding of what an
appropriate and normative behavior is, and ii) their judgment about a selfish
deviation from the normative behavior.5 Furthermore, together with the cogni-
tive ability task and the questionnaire at the end of the session, both observers
and dictators had to indicate if any of them tried to communicate through the
video, and if so, in which way. The observers earned an equivalent of 5 tokens
in Croatian kunas for their role of observer. To make average payoff identical
across different roles in the game, observers additionally earned an equivalent
of 5 tokens in Croatian kunas for the additional questions they had to answer.
Analogously to the dictators, they were informed about the additional payment
during the payoff procedure.
To design a comparable control treatment, we addressed two concerns. First,
in both our treatments, subjects were exposed to a video on their screen. Focus-
ing on a video could drain cognitive resources, which in turn might reduce the
5 The key concern in this elicitation was to ensure that even 7 year-old children can fully
comprehend and answer our questions. For that reason, we do not differentiate between personal
or social norms, and we do not ask for the children’s opinions of what their peers might think the
norm is (see Krupka and Weber, 2013). Moreover, we choose the word “fair” as it is akin to the
words “appropriate” and “moral”, which are commonly used in order to elicit injunctive social
norms (see Krupka and Weber, 2013), but is more understandable for children.
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ability of subjects to restrain their selfish impulses and would bias our results
(Gino et al., 2011; Achtziger et al., 2015).6 Second, in both treatments sub-
jects saw a person on their screen who was looking at them: themselves in the
Self-image treatment, and observer in the Social image treatment. This bears
potential of influencing one’s behavior, as studies indicate that a simple social
cue, such as a pair of observing eyes can provoke a feeling of observation and
influence subjects to act more prosocially (Bateson et al., 2006; Rigdon et al.,
2009).7 To address these two concerns, our Control treatment is identical to the
other two treatments, except that instead of seeing themselves or their observer,
subjects saw a neutral mute video of another child looking at them. For the video,
we chose a short clip of a TV show in which children present news. This ensured
that the child in the video is constantly looking at the camera and is acting in a
neutral manner, not transmitting any tendentious associations.8 Moreover, this
allowed us to choose two similar videos to better match the age of the child in
the video to the age of the subjects: one video was used with subjects in 2nd
and 4th grade, and another with subjects in 6th and 8th grade (see Figures 4.3
and 4.4 in Appendix).9 It was clear that the video is an old prerecorded video,
which was also explicitly mentioned by the experimenter.
4.2.2 Procedure and subject pool
The study was conducted in Samobor, a town in central Croatia with an approxi-
mate population of 38,000. The participants were students in 2nd, 4th, 6th and
8th grade of elementary school, and were 7-8, 9-10, 11-12 and 13-14 years old,
respectively.10 For the main analysis we group children into two age cohorts:
6 Note, however, that several studies suggest that the fundamental human impulse is to react
prosocially; hence, in this respect, existence of a video could favor prosocial behavior (Rand et al.,
2012; Schulz et al., 2014).
7 Note, however, that some studies do not find an effect of social cues (Fehr and Schnei-
der, 2010; Lamba and Mace, 2010), and question the validity of previous findings (Carbon and
Hesslinger, 2011).
8 Notice that our choice of the control treatment makes any potential effect of cognitive deple-
tion or social cues constant across all three treatments. Hence, any behavioral difference caused
by our two treatments can be attributed to self-awareness or observability, respectively.
9 If social cues matter, videos with persons of different age could potentially cause different
effects, e.g., a person older than the subject might trigger stronger willingness to act in line of
societal standards. Hence, we took special care in choosing two appropriate and age-fitting videos.
Note, however, that the change of the video has no effect on children’s behavior. Specifically, in a
regression model, video has no effect on dictator’s giving when taking age into account, and the
age coefficient stays very similar when excluding the video variable (see Table 4.4 in Appendix).
10 Our sample contains few exceptions where subjects are slightly older or younger than their
classmates. Also, one subject was 15 years of age; hence, we included the subject in the 11-14
year-old age cohort.
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younger children (7-10y) and older children (11-14y), but we further analyze
the data on a more detailed level using exact age when appropriate.11
We recruited our subjects from 2 elementary schools.12 Specifically, we in-
vited all students from all classes in 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th grade to participate.
Altogether, there were 30 participating classes across the two schools. 73% of
invited students participated in the experiment, which resulted in 494 subjects
(52% girls). 129 students participated in the Control treatment, 117 in the Self-
image treatment, and 248 in the Social image treatment: 124 in the role of dicta-
tors and 124 in the role of recipients, respectively. Sessions were organized dur-
ing regular school hours. Both schools ensured a private room for us in which we
set up our lab in the field. Our lab was equipped with four laptops, each placed
in a separate cubicle (see Figure 4.5 in Appendix). We conducted within-session
randomization. In particular, there was one computer designated for Self-image
treatment, one for Control treatment, and two for Social image treatment: one
for observer and one for dictator. During the experiment, we balanced the ex-
perimenter assignments across different treatments in each school at the grade
level to minimize any experimenter fixed effects.
At the beginning of each session an experimenter would arrive to a class
which was participating in the study, and would randomly choose four subjects
and escort them to the experimental room. One of the four experimenters would
then assign them to different treatments while trying to ensure that children of
different gender go to different treatments in comparison to the former session,
ensuring balanced gender assignment across treatments. Before starting with
the verbal instructions, each subject received a unique code. It was explained
to the children that their choices are fully anonymous, and that instead of their
name, only their code will be used during the study. Following that, the ex-
perimenters would proceed with the verbal experimental instructions for the
respective treatments. During the explanation of the dictator game, subjects
were informed that the recipient was a student of their own age but was not
from their class. They were also informed that the recipients will know the rules
11 The age split between younger and older children represents the average age of the children’s
age span, but more importantly, i) 11-12 years of age represents an important shift in children
development, as it is the usual age when children enter puberty, and ii) recent work proposes
that 7-10 is the age when reputation should start being an important factor (Warneken, 2018).
12 The choice and the location of the two schools minimizes potential selection issues. Specifi-
cally, the schools participating in the study represent two out of three elementary schools in the
town; there exists no clear difference in the quality of the three schools, and the children primar-
ily enroll in a specific elementary school based on the proximity of their home. Furthermore, the
probability of a child going to a different town to elementary school is negligible, similarly as the
probability of moving to a different town due to perceived differences in school quality. The latter
is extremely uncommon in Croatian society. Finally, note that elementary school is obligatory in
Croatia, and the self-selection into different tracks occurs when students finish elementary school
and choose between different high schools.
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of the dictator game, and will know their final decision in the game. At the
end of the instructions, subjects were asked to answer the control questions. In
case a subject would not succeed in answering the control questions, the exper-
imenter would explain the main aspects of the game again and repeat the con-
trol questions. Those who did not manage to answer all of the control questions
continued their participation; however, we excluded them from the subsequent
analysis. Out of 371 dictators, only 5 did not manage to answer the control ques-
tions.13 To minimize any influence on the subject’s behavior, the experimenter
moved away from the computer during the dictator game, and sat on a chair
from where neither the subject nor the subject’s screen could be observed. Sim-
ilarly, the experimenter turned away during the cognitive ability test to avoid
any unnecessary pressure on a subject’s performance.
To keep marginal incentives comparable, we adjusted the token values ac-
cording to the grade. To estimate these values, we used a previously collected
dataset of weekly pocket allowance from 3 Croatian schools, and adjusted the to-
ken values accordingly (see Table 4.5 in Appendix). 2nd grade children received
1 kuna for a token, 4th grade children received 1.5 kunas for a token, 6th grade
children received 2.3 kunas for a token, and 8th grade children received 3.5
kunas for a token. 1 kuna = 0.145 US dollars at the time of the experiment.
Alongside the payments from the game, children earned an additional 2 tokens
worth of kunas for their participation in the study. The payment was given in
a sealed envelope within two weeks after the experiment. The experiment was
approved by the Croatian Ministry of Science and Education, the principals of
both schools, and by the by Ethics Committee at the University of Bonn. Each
parent gave written consent for their child to participate after learning about
the nature of the study and the possible consequences. Each child gave verbal
assent at the beginning of the experimental session to the experimenter.
4.3 Results
We divide our results section into two subsections. In the first subsection, we
analyze the behavior of the entire sample. In the second subsection, we analyze
and compare the behavior across genders.
4.3.1 Behavior of the entire sample
We first check if the treatments had an effect on the entire sample. We report
OLS regression models in Table 4.1 where we regress the amount given by dic-
tators on dummy variables for Self-image and Social image treatment and addi-
13 Our findings stay robust when we include these 5 subjects in the analysis.
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Table 4.1. OLS regressions estimates of treatment eects
Variables Dependent variable: given amount of tokens
7-14y 7-10y 11-14y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-image 0.246 0.255 0.613* 0.458 -0.070 0.014
(0.234) (0.227) (0.338) (0.344) (0.320) (0.313)
Social image 0.267 0.422* 0.495 0.661* 0.058 0.291
(0.244) (0.245) (0.373) (0.367) (0.318) (0.331)
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 3.180*** 0.221 2.746*** 1.364 3.551*** -0.131
(0.165) (2.156) (0.237) (3.545) (0.223) (2.507)
Observations 366 366 166 166 200 200
R-squared 0.004 0.078 0.020 0.095 0.001 0.121
Notes: The table presents OLS regressions using given amount of tokens as the dependent variable.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables include
daily pocket allowance, standardized measure of patience, number of siblings, child’s age, cogni-
tive abilities normalized at the age cohort level, and dummy variables for gender (1 if girl), hearing
any information about the experiment before the session, attempt of communication from dicta-
tor towards observer, attempt of communication from observer towards dictator, and school xed
eects.
tional control variables.14 Model (1) reveals that neither Self nor Social image
treatment have a significant effect on the given amount. Model (2) reveals that
if we include control variables, the Self-image treatment remains insignificant,
while the Social image treatment shows weak indications of a positive effect, as
the coefficient becomes significant at a 10% level.
Next we check if there is a development pattern of behavior across age, and
divide our sample into two age groups: younger children (7-10y) and older
children (11-14y). First, we observe that 11-14 year-old children give on av-
erage 3.551 tokens in the Control treatment (constant in Table 4.1, Column
(5)), which is significantly more than the 2.746 tokens that 7-10 year-old chil-
dren give (constant in Table 4.1, Column (3); two-sided t-test, p = 0.015, N(7-
10y)=59, N(11-14y)=69). The same relation is observed if we regress giving
on age of child, and also, if we include control variables (see Table 4.7 in Ap-
14 The findings stay robust when using tobit estimations (see Table 4.6 in Appendix).
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pendix).15 On average, an increase of age by one year increases giving by 0.212
tokens. Next, we look at the linear regression models in Table 4.1 where we
regress giving on the two treatments, separately for each age cohort. For 7-10
year-old children, we find a weakly significant effect of Self-image treatment;
however, the significance disappears when including control variables (Models
(3) and (4)). The opposite holds true for Social image treatment, as we observe
significance with control variables but not without. Turning to 11-14 year-old
children, we observe no significance for any of the two treatments (Models (5)
and (6)).
Altogether, while we find slight indications that Self and Social image treat-
ment cause an effect on behavior, the effects are small and not robust. This holds
true for the entire sample, and also when we check for different age cohorts.
4.3.2 Behavior across genders
Next, to investigate potential gender differences proposed by evolutionary the-
ories, we divide the sample across genders, and repeat the analysis separately
for boys and girls in Table 4.2.16 Models (1) and (2) show the effect of Self-
image and Social image treatment on the entire sample of boys. We observe a
significant effect of the Social image treatment, as boys increase their giving by
0.747 tokens, which corresponds to an increase of 25.6%. Similarly, we observe
a significant effect of the Self-image treatment (at 10% level), as boys increase
their giving by 0.553 tokens, which corresponds to an increase of 18.9%. Both
effects remain significant when including control variables. Next, we focus on
the behavior of girls (Models (3) and (4)). In contrast to boys, girls do not signif-
icantly react to any of the two manipulation treatments. To further investigate
this difference in behavior across the two genders, we compare if there is a
baseline difference in behavior without any manipulation. Although boys give
less on average, we find no significant difference (2.919 vs 3.424, constants
in Table 4.2, Columns (1) and (3); two-sided t-test, p = 0.128, N(boys)= 62,
N(girl)=66). Second, we check for the interaction effects between gender and
treatment (Models (5) and (6)). We find that when being observed, boys’ giv-
ing increases significantly more than girls’ giving (at 10% level), and this finding
stays robust when including control variables. Moreover, we also find a similar
gender pattern for the Self-image treatment, but the interaction effect is not sig-
nificant.
15 Five children from 2nd grade did not know when they were born, and we did not manage to
ex-post find out what their age was; hence, we use the mean age of children within their grade
level for their age.
16 The findings stay robust when using tobit estimations (see Table 4.8 in Appendix).
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Table 4.2. OLS regressions estimates of treatments eects by gender
Variables Dependent variable: given amount of tokens
Boys Girls Boys and girls Boys
7-14y 7-14y 7-14y 7-10y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Self-image 0.553* 0.565* -0.041 -0.020 0.553* 0.551* 1.202***
(0.323) (0.317) (0.337) (0.335) (0.323) (0.312) (0.439)
Social image 0.747** 0.877** -0.208 -0.042 0.747** 0.844** 1.066**
(0.334) (0.337) (0.353) (0.354) (0.334) (0.326) (0.470)
Girl (=1) 0.505 0.437
(0.328) (0.315)
Self-image*Girl -0.594 -0.574
(0.467) (0.454)
Social image*Girl -0.955* -0.829*
(0.486) (0.464)
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Constant 2.919*** -1.591 3.424*** 1.816 2.919*** -0.053 2.452***
(0.222) (2.528) (0.242) (3.158) (0.222) (2.172) (0.293)
Observations 180 180 186 186 366 366 86
R-squared 0.030 0.126 0.002 0.075 0.016 0.087 0.090
Boys Boys Girls Girls
7-10y 11-14y 7-10y 11-14y
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Self-image 1.093** -0.077 -0.057 0.003 -0.082 -0.048 0.063
(0.452) (0.462) (0.486) (0.512) (0.554) (0.445) (0.436)
Social image 1.055** 0.407 0.652 -0.151 0.127 -0.256 -0.006
(0.456) (0.469) (0.496) (0.588) (0.582) (0.434) (0.451)
Control variables Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 2.049 3.387*** 0.251 3.071*** 0.363 3.684*** 0.305
(3.386) (0.317) (5.483) (0.375) (6.330) (0.314) (2.561)
Observations 86 94 94 80 80 106 106
R-squared 0.247 0.014 0.130 0.001 0.070 0.004 0.150
Notes: The table presents OLS regressions using given amount of tokens as the dependent vari-
able. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables in-
clude daily pocket allowance, standardized measure of patience, number of siblings, child’s age,
cognitive abilities normalized at the age cohort level, and dummy variables for hearing any infor-
mation about the experiment before the session, attempt of communication from dictator towards
observer, attempt of communication from observer towards dictator, and school xed eects.
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Figure 4.1. Average given amount of tokens for 7-10 and 11-14 year-old children
separated by gender: boys (upper panel) and girls (lower panel)
Next, we investigate the development pattern of dictator behavior across
age for the two genders. To visualize our findings, in Figure 4.1 we present
the behavior for boys (upper panel) and girls (lower panel) for 7-10 year-old
children and 11-14 year old-children.We first examine the behavior of 7-10 year-
old boys (Table 4.2, Models (7) and (8)). We observe that young boys exhibit
a significant reaction to both treatments, as they increase their giving by 1.202
tokens in the Self-image treatment (increase of 49.0%), and by 1.066 tokens in
the Social image treatment (increase of 43.5%). The findings stay robust when
controlling for additional variables. Older boys (11-14y), however, exhibit much
weaker reactions to the two image treatments (Models (9) and (10)). Their
giving in the Self-image treatment stays similar to the Control treatment, while
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their giving in the Social image treatment increases by 0.407 tokens, but the
increase is not significant. If we look at the behavior of girls (Models (11, 12, 13)
and (14)), we see a stark contrast in comparison to the behavior of boys. Girls
do not exhibit any reaction to the image treatments. None of the comparisons in
7-10 or 11-14 year-old girls shows significance. Finally, we also check if in the
Social image treatment gender of the observer matters. Specifically, it could be
that boys react more when girls are observing them (see Van Vugt and Iredale,
2013; Raihani and S. Smith, 2015). We do not find any evidence in support of
this (see Table 4.9 in Appendix).
Altogether, we observe that in the overall sample, boys react positively to
both Self-image treatment and Social image treatment, while girls do not react to
any of the two treatments. Moreover, the reaction to the Social image treatment
is significantly stronger in boys than in girls. Looking at the age development,
we observe a significant effect of the two image treatments in younger boys
(7-10y) but not in older boys (11-14y).
Next, to better understand the mechanisms behind the marked gender dif-
ference, we investigate if this can be explained by differences in understanding
of normative behavior across genders. In particular, if boys think that the fairest
transfer is higher than girls, one could argue that such normative valuation dif-
ference can drive the behavioral difference between the two genders, as the
equivalent action might indicate selfishness in the view of boys, but not girls.
Similarly, it could be that a certain violation of normative behavior is viewed as
less appropriate by boys than by girls.17 To investigate this conjecture, in Table
4.3 we present the average answers on questions about the fairest transfer in the
game and the perceived fairness of giving 2 tokens, which were answered by the
observers. The findings reveal that both questions about fairness do not differ
across genders in any of the age cohorts or the entire sample, suggesting that
the understanding of normative behavior cannot explain the behavioral gender
difference we observe. Furthermore, the table reveals another important obser-
vation. For the 11-14 year-old children, the average opinion on the fairest choice
comes fairly close to the children’s actual behavior, suggesting a potential reason
why we do not observe any effect of our two image treatments on behavior of
the older children, at least in the case of boys who react to our treatments when
they are younger (behavior=3.387 vs fairest choice=4.303 for 11-14 year-old
boys, behavior=3.684 vs fairest choice=4.865 for 11-14 year-old girls).
17 This connects to recent signaling models (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006), which imply the
following: Falling short from existing social norms stigmatizes a person and negatively impacts his
or her reputation, and also, an action which is below the social norm infers in expectation an exact
(low) level of person’s type, i.e., person’s preference for generosity. Hence, if i) understanding of
a normative behavior or ii) the judgment about the selfish deviation from a normative behavior
would differ between the two genders, this might provoke asymmetric reactions to increased
image concerns.
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Table 4.3. Perceived fairest transfer and perceived fairness of giving 2 tokens
7-14y 7-10y 11-14y
Fairest
choice
Giving 2
tokens
Fairest
choice
Giving 2
tokens
Fairest
choice
Giving 2
tokens
Boys 4.649 2.596 5.125 2.459 4.303 2.700
(0.215) (0.143) (0.423) (0.225) (0.192) (0.187)
Girls 4.939 2.561 5.035 2.621 4.865 2.514
(0.089) (0.119) (0.105) (0.195) (0.135) (0.148)
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 for two-sided t-test comparisons between boys and girls for a
given age cohort, sd in parentheses. The numbers represent the average answers of observers on
following questions: “what do you think is fair - how many tokens should the student whom you
see on the screen give to the other student”, and “if the student whom you see on the screen gave
2 tokens to the other student, how fair would it be”, separated by gender and age cohort.
4.4 Discussion and conclusion
In this study we show that both self and social image concerns are an important
driver of prosocial behavior in children and adolescents (7-14y), however, only
for boys. In our Social image treatment, we observe that boys react to increased
observability, significantly stronger than girls, who do not react. This stark gen-
der result supports evolutionary theories which suggest that men are more likely
to signal prosocial traits (see Trivers, 1972; Amotz Zahavi and Avishag Zahavi,
1999; E. A. Smith and Bird, 2000; Raihani and S. Smith, 2015). Importantly,
our results show that the roots of this gender asymmetry lie early in human de-
velopment. We do not find that boys react more to girl observers as one might
expect from the mentioned theories; however, studies that find such a result in
adults use attractive women as observers and find that the decision maker’s be-
havior is closely connected to the subjective perception of the attractiveness of
the female observer (Van Vugt and Iredale, 2013; Raihani and S. Smith, 2015).
This approach was unfeasible to implement with our young subject pool.
Similarly to the gender asymmetry we observe in the Social image treatment,
we also observe that only boys react to our Self-image treatment. It is possible,
as it could be explained by signaling models, that boys care more about their
image than girls, regardless of the image domain. Connected to this, Von Hippel
and Trivers (2011) suggest that when people need to convince others about a
certain private quality, they engage in self-deception and convince themselves,
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as it avoids the need for conscious deception. Schwardmann and van der Weele
(2017) report causal evidence supporting this hypothesis, and show that such
self-deception makes people more persuasive when convincing others. If so, the
fact that boys are self-signaling prosocial traits could help them credibly con-
vince others that they are prosocial when the chance arises, e.g., in our Social
image treatment. Alternatively, boys’ high self-image concerns do not need to
be connected to their high social image concerns. Bašić et al. (2018) find that
women aremore prosocial thanmen, but when confronted with a self-awareness
manipulation, only men increase their prosocial behavior, and they reach a simi-
lar level of prosocial behavior as women. The authors offer evidence that women
are generally more self-aware than men, and hence might already be strongly
focused on their inner standards of behavior without the self-awareness manip-
ulation. While we do not find a significant difference in behavior across genders
in our Control treatment, the behavioral patterns are in line with this potential
explanation, suggesting that indeed, the fact that only boys react to the self-
awareness manipulation could be due to girls’ higher baseline self-awareness.
Our findings also offer insights for the question whether the observed gender
difference is due to normative understanding or behavior, or is it a true differ-
ence in preference for image concerns. This is of special importance in our setup,
as different genders might develop their normative understanding at a different
pace, causing the gender findings we observe. Our findings suggest that the dif-
ference is not driven by differences in normative understanding, suggesting a
true difference in preferences for image concerns. The normative valuation we
elicit also connects to other important observations. Specifically, when dividing
the sample in younger and older subjects, we observe the treatment effects only
in younger boys. The cause of this is an increase of dictator’s giving with age,
which is offset by a stagnating level of giving in the two image treatments across
younger and older boys. A reasonable explanation to this observation is the fact
that in the Control treatment older boys act very close to what they think is fair.
If in the image treatments subjects just want to appear fair, they again will act in
a similar manner. Importantly, this might suggest that image concerns can cause
an effect as long as the inner prosocial preferences are sufficiently underdevel-
oped and leave scope for an increase, as we observe in younger boys. Alternative
to this explanation, it is possible that at the age of 11-14, boys’ concerns for im-
age diminish. This, however, goes strongly against the common finding that in
early adolescence children become more aware of, and increasingly concerned
with, the opinion of others (see Vartanian, 2000). They start shaping their social
behavior according to their peers (Steinberg and Silverberg, 1986), and are dis-
tressed if they feel excluded (Sebastian et al., 2010). Hence, while our results
cannot dismiss this explanation, it seems implausible.
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Appendix 4.A Time preferences
For eliciting time preferences we used experimentally validated questions of Falk
et al. (2016). We used one main question from the refined version of their pref-
erence module: “How willing are you to give up something that is beneficial for
you today in order to benefit more from that in the future”. Given the complex-
ity of the second suggested question in their preference module, we decided for
an alternative question from their study as our second question of time prefer-
ences: “Do you often postpone things even though it would be better to take care
of them right away”. Both questions were answered on a 5 point likert scale. To
ensure comprehension, experimenters were also providing examples, fitting to
the respective question. To produce the measure of time preferences that we use
in the study (patience), we added the answer on the first question to the reverse
answer on the second question, and have standardized the measure.
Appendix 4.B Experimental instructions
The following section contains experimental instructions translated from Croat-
ian.
4.B.1 Dictator: Control treatment
Hello, take a seat.
Please give me your parental consent. (The experimenter turns the parental
consent on the blank side and puts it on the table.)
Ok, we can start. This is a study in which you will earn some money. The
study consists of one game and some tasks. You will get (value of two tokens
adjusted to the grade level) kunas just for participation, and additionally you can
win some money in the game. Before we start with the study, I want to tell you
that your participation is fully voluntary, and you can decide to quit at any time,
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without any consequences. So first, I want to ask you: Do you want to start with
the study? (The experimenter writes down the subject’s answer on the blank side
of parental consent, and signs next to it.)
You will get all the money that you earn in the study in a closed envelope
within 2 weeks of today. During the study, we will use a code instead of your
name. Your name will never be used. Only your code will be written on the en-
velope containing your money. (The experimenter takes a deck of cards with codes
written on them, and holds it so the cards are turned down. Following that, the
experimenter takes the top card and shows it to the child.) Here, this is your card
with your code. I will type it now in the computer. (Experimenter types the code
and presses the button for next screen.) Here, this is your code now. (Experimenter
returns the card to the child.) Take good care of it, so you can get your money!
Also write the code from the card in your notebook later, so in case you lose the
card you will still know your code.
Ok, now you will play a game. Before you start, I will explain you the rules
of the game. You will play the game on this computer. During the game, you will
constantly see this old TV video playing on your screen.
Now I will explain you the rules. The game is being played in pairs of two.
You are in a pair with one other player of similar age as you but not from your
class. I will not tell you who he is neither will I tell the second player who you
are. That will remain a secret.
The second player will get (value of two tokens adjusted to the grade level)
kunas for participation, the same as you. Howmany kunas will the second player
get in the game, that depends on you. The game is played with tokens. Each
token is worth (token value adjusted to the grade level) kunas. That means that
for every token that you are left with at the end of the game, you will get (token
value adjusted to the grade level) kunas. Equivalently, the second player will also
get (token value adjusted to the grade level) kunas for each token that he is left
with at the end of the game.
At the beginning of the game you have 10 tokens. The second player has 0
tokens. Your task is to decide how many tokens you want to give to the second
player. The second player cannot influence your decision, and at the end of the
game he will only get the tokens that you give him. Also, the second player will
know that you had 10 tokens at the beginning of the game, and he will know
how many you left for yourself, and how many you gave him.
(The experimenter takes a sheet with the printed decision screen.) Here, on this
picture you can see how your task will look on the computer screen. Your task is
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to decide how many tokens you want to give to the second player. For example,
if you want to give 0 tokens to the second player, and leave all 10 tokens for
yourself, then you just click on this box, where it’s written “0” - hence, you give
him 0 tokens. If you want to give 5 tokens to the second player, and leave 5
tokens for yourself, then you click on this box, where it’s written “5” - so, you
give him 5 tokens. Or for example, if you want to give 2 tokens to the second
player, and leave 8 tokens for yourself, then you click here where it’s written
“2”. When you make your decision, you still have to click the “confirm” button
to confirm your decision. When you’ll be making your decision I will move away,
so I won’t find out how many tokens you gave to the second player. Do you have
any questions?
Ok, now I will ask you several questions to see if you understood the game.
1. How much money is each token worth?
2. Who is the second player in the game?
3. How many tokens do you have, and how many tokens does the second
player have at the beginning of the game?
4. What is your task in the game?
(If the subject does not know how to answer one question, the experimenter
answers it, and repeats the question at the end. If the subject does not know how to
answer two questions, the experimenter shortly repeats the rules of the game and
then again asks all the questions. If the subject again does not know how to answer
one question, the experimenter answers it, and repeats it at the end. If the subject
again fails to answer two questions, the experiment continues, and at the end of the
study experimenter marks that the subject failed to answer the control questions.)
Ok, I will move away now. When you are ready to play the game press this
button in the lower-right corner and wait until the next screen appears, where
you will decide how many tokens you want to give to the second player. Do you
have any remaining questions? When you will be done, please raise your hand.
When I see that you raised your hand, I will come back. (The experimenter moves
aside and sits on a chair. After the subject raises his hand, the experimenter comes
back, turns off the video, and continues with the symbol correspondence test and
the questionnaire. At the end of the study, the subject is told not to talk about the
study with other students that did not yet participate.)
4.B.2 Dictator: Self-image treatment
Hello, take a seat.
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Please give me your parental consent. (The experimenter turns the parental
consent on the blank side and puts it on the table.)
Ok, we can start. This is a study in which you will earn some money. The
study consists of one game and some tasks. You will get (value of two tokens
adjusted to the grade level) kunas just for participation, and additionally you can
win some money in the game. Before we start with the study, I want to tell you
that your participation is fully voluntary, and you can decide to quit at any time,
without any consequences. So first, I want to ask you: Do you want to start with
the study? (The experimenter writes down the subject’s answer on the blank side
of parental consent, and signs next to it.)
You will get all the money that you earn in the study in a closed envelope
within 2 weeks of today. During the study, we will use a code instead of your
name. Your name will never be used. Only your code will be written on the en-
velope containing your money. (The experimenter takes a deck of cards with codes
written on them, and holds it so the cards are turned down. Following that, the
experimenter takes the top card and shows it to the child.) Here, this is your card
with your code. I will type it now in the computer. (Experimenter types the code
and presses the button for next screen.) Here, this is your code now. (Experimenter
returns the card to the child.) Take good care of it, so you can get your money!
Also write the code from the card in your notebook later, so in case you lose the
card you will still know your code.
Ok, now you will play a game. Before you start, I will explain you the rules
of the game. You will play the game on this computer. During the game, you
will constantly see your reflection in the screen. (Experimenter waves his or her
hand to show that it is a real-time video). That is just your reflection through the
camera - the video is not being recorded.
Now I will explain you the rules. The game is being played in pairs of two.
You are in a pair with one other player of similar age as you but not from your
class. I will not tell you who he is neither will I tell the second player who you
are. That will remain a secret.
The second player will get (value of two tokens adjusted to the grade level)
kunas for participation, the same as you. Howmany kunas will the second player
get in the game, that depends on you. The game is played with tokens. Each
token is worth (token value adjusted to the grade level) kunas. That means that
for every token that you are left with at the end of the game, you will get (token
value adjusted to the grade level) kunas. Equivalently, the second player will also
get (token value adjusted to the grade level) kunas for each token that he is left
with at the end of the game.
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At the beginning of the game you have 10 tokens. The second player has 0
tokens. Your task is to decide how many tokens you want to give to the second
player. The second player cannot influence your decision, and at the end of the
game he will only get the tokens that you give him. Also, the second player will
know that you had 10 tokens at the beginning of the game, and he will know
how many you left for yourself, and how many you gave him.
(The experimenter takes a sheet with the printed decision screen.) Here, on this
picture you can see how your task will look on the computer screen. Your task is
to decide how many tokens you want to give to the second player. For example,
if you want to give 0 tokens to the second player, and leave all 10 tokens for
yourself, then you just click on this box, where it’s written “0” - hence, you give
him 0 tokens. If you want to give 5 tokens to the second player, and leave 5
tokens for yourself, then you click on this box, where it’s written “5” - so, you
give him 5 tokens. Or for example, if you want to give 2 tokens to the second
player, and leave 8 tokens for yourself, then you click here where it’s written
“2”. When you make your decision, you still have to click the “confirm” button
to confirm your decision. When you’ll be making your decision I will move away,
so I won’t find out how many tokens you gave to the second player. Do you have
any questions?
Ok, now I will ask you several questions to see if you understood the game.
1. How much money is each token worth?
2. Who is the second player in the game?
3. How many tokens do you have, and how many tokens does the second
player have at the beginning of the game?
4. What is your task in the game?
(If the subject does not know how to answer one question, the experimenter
answers it, and repeats the question at the end. If the subject does not know how to
answer two questions, the experimenter shortly repeats the rules of the game and
then again asks all the questions. If the subject again does not know how to answer
one question, the experimenter answers it, and repeats it at the end. If the subject
again fails to answer two questions, the experiment continues, and at the end of the
study experimenter marks that the subject failed to answer the control questions.)
Ok, I will move away now. When you are ready to play the game press this
button in the lower-right corner and wait until the next screen appears, where
you will decide how many tokens you want to give to the second player. Do you
have any remaining questions? When you will be done, please raise your hand.
When I see that you raised your hand, I will come back. (The experimenter moves
aside and sits on a chair. After the subject raises his or her hand, the experimenter
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comes back, turns off the video, and continues with the symbol correspondence test
and the questionnaire. At the end of the study, the subject is told not to talk about
the study with other students that did not yet participate.)
4.B.3 Dictator: Social image treatment
Hello, take a seat.
Please give me your parental consent. (The experimenter turns the parental
consent on the blank side and puts it on the table.)
Ok, we can start. This is a study in which you will earn some money. The
study consists of one game and some tasks. You will get (value of two tokens
adjusted to the grade level) kunas just for participation, and additionally you can
win some money in the game. Before we start with the study, I want to tell you
that your participation is fully voluntary, and you can decide to quit at any time,
without any consequences. So first, I want to ask you: Do you want to start with
the study? (The experimenter writes down the subject’s answer on the blank side
of parental consent, and signs next to it.)
You will get all the money that you earn in the study in a closed envelope
within 2 weeks of today. During the study, we will use a code instead of your
name. Your name will never be used. Only your code will be written on the en-
velope containing your money. (The experimenter takes a deck of cards with codes
written on them, and holds it so the cards are turned down. Following that, the
experimenter takes the top card and shows it to the child.) Here, this is your card
with your code. I will type it now in the computer. (Experimenter types the code
and presses the button for next screen.) Here, this is your code now. (Experimenter
returns the card to the child.) Take good care of it, so you can get your money!
Also write the code from the card in your notebook later, so in case you lose the
card you will still know your code.
Ok, now you will play a game. Before you start, I will explain you the rules of
the game. You will play the game on this computer. As you see, you can observe
another student from your class on the screen. Come on, wave to him / her so
you can see that he / she also sees you. As you can see, you see the student
in real-time. The video is not being recorded. The student that you see is your
observer. Your observer sees you on his / her computer, but he / she also sees
your screen. That means that he / she sees every move you make with your
mouse, and is going to see your decisions during the game. His / her task is to
observe the decisions you make during the game. Same as you, he / she will
know the rules of the game. During the game, you cannot communicate with
the observer, ok? That means that you cannot wave, make strange faces, etc.
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Now I will explain you the rules. The game is being played in pairs of two.
You are in a pair with one other player of similar age as you but not from your
class. I will not tell you who he is neither will I tell the second player who you
are. That will remain a secret.
Just to mention, the second player that is paired with you is not the observer
that you see on the screen.
The second player will get (value of two tokens adjusted to the grade level)
kunas for participation, the same as you. Howmany kunas will the second player
get in the game, that depends on you. The game is played with tokens. Each
token is worth (token value adjusted to the grade level) kunas. That means that
for every token that you are left with at the end of the game, you will get (token
value adjusted to the grade level) kunas. Equivalently, the second player will also
get (token value adjusted to the grade level) kunas for each token that he is left
with at the end of the game.
At the beginning of the game you have 10 tokens. The second player has 0
tokens. Your task is to decide how many tokens you want to give to the second
player. The second player cannot influence your decision, and at the end of the
game he will only get the tokens that you give him. Also, the second player will
know that you had 10 tokens at the beginning of the game, and he will know
how many you left for yourself, and how many you gave him.
(The experimenter takes a sheet with the printed decision screen.) Here, on this
picture you can see how your task will look on the computer screen. Your task is
to decide how many tokens you want to give to the second player. For example,
if you want to give 0 tokens to the second player, and leave all 10 tokens for
yourself, then you just click on this box, where it’s written “0” - hence, you give
him 0 tokens. If you want to give 5 tokens to the second player, and leave 5
tokens for yourself, then you click on this box, where it’s written “5” - so, you
give him 5 tokens. Or for example, if you want to give 2 tokens to the second
player, and leave 8 tokens for yourself, then you click here where it’s written
“2”. When you make your decision, you still have to click the “confirm” button
to confirm your decision. When you’ll be making your decision I will move away,
so I won’t find out how many tokens you gave to the second player. Do you have
any questions?
Ok, now I will ask you several questions to see if you understood the game.
1. What is the observer’s task in the game?
2. How much money is each token worth?
3. Who is the second player in the game?
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4. How many tokens do you have, and how many tokens does the second
player have at the beginning of the game?
5. What is your task in the game?
(If the subject does not know how to answer one question, the experimenter
answers it, and repeats the question at the end. If the subject does not know how to
answer two questions, the experimenter shortly repeats the rules of the game and
then again asks all the questions. If the subject again does not know how to answer
one question, the experimenter answers it, and repeats it at the end. If the subject
again fails to answer two questions, the experiment continues, and at the end of the
study experimenter marks that the subject failed to answer the control questions.)
Ok, I will move away now. When you are ready to play the game press this
button in the lower-right corner and wait until the next screen appears, where
you will decide how many tokens you want to give to the second player. Do you
have any remaining questions? When you will be done, please raise your hand.
When I see that you raised your hand, I will come back. (The experimenter moves
aside and sits on a chair. After the subject raises his or her hand, the experimenter
comes back, turns off the video, and continues with the symbol correspondence test
and the questionnaire. At the end of the study, the subject is told not to talk about
the study with other students that did not yet participate.)
4.B.4 Observer
Hello, take a seat.
Please give me your parental consent. (The experimenter turns the parental
consent on the blank side and puts it on the table.)
Ok, we can start. This is a study in which you will earn some money. The
study consists of one game and some tasks. You will get (value of two tokens
adjusted to the grade level) kunas just for participation, and additionally you will
earn some money for your role in the game. Before we start with the study, I
want to tell you that your participation is fully voluntary, and you can decide to
quit at any time, without any consequences. So first, I want to ask you, do you
want start with the study? (The experimenter writes down the subject’s answer on
the blank side of parental consent, and signs next to it.)
You will get all the money that you earn in the study in a closed envelope
within two weeks of today. During the study, we will use a code instead of your
name. Your name will never be used. Only your code will be written on the
envelope containing your money. (The experimenter takes a deck of cards with
codes written on them, and holds it so the cards are turned down. Following that,
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the experimenter takes the top card and shows it to the child.) Here, this is your
card with your code. Take good care of it, so you can get your money! Also write
the code from the card in your notebook later, so in case you lose the card you
will still know your code.
Ok, now we can start with the study. You will participate in the study on this
computer. You can see another student from your class on the screen. Let’s wait
until the student waves to you. (Observer waits until the other student waves.)
Wave back to him / her, so he / she knows that you see him / her. As you can
see, you see the student in real-time. The video is not being recorded. As you
can see him / her, he / she can also see you. But in addition, you also see his /
her screen. What you see here is actually the screen of the student that you are
observing.
The student that you see will play one game. Your task is to observe what he
/ she will do in this game. You will see everything that he / she does here on the
screen. You just have to wait and observe. You cannot interfere or communicate
with the child that is playing the game, ok? That means that you cannot wave,
make strange faces, etc. For your role of the observer you will get (value of five
tokens adjusted to the grade level) kunas.
Now I will explain you the rules of the game that you will watch. The student
that you are observing got 10 tokens. Each token is worth (token value adjusted
to the grade level) kunas. That means that for each token that he / she is left
with at the end of that game, he / she is going to get (token value adjusted to
the grade level) kunas. The task of this student is to decide how many tokens
he / she wants to give to one other student. He / she does not know who this
student is, but he / she knows that this student is of similar age, but is from
another class. The student you are observing can give as many tokens as he /
she likes to the other student. That is his / her decision. The other student that
will receive the tokens will not know who gave him the tokens. He will just know
that there were 10 tokens to divide, and how many tokens he got.
(The experimenter takes a sheet with the printed decision screen.) Here, on
this picture you can see how the task of this student will look on the computer
screen. When he / she makes a decision how many tokens he / she wants to
give to the other student, he / she will press the box with that number. For
example, if he / she wants to give 3 tokens to the other student, and leave 7
tokens for himself / herself, he / she will choose the box with number “3” and
press on it. Or, if he / she wants to give 1 token to the other student, and leave 9
tokens for himself / herself, he / she will choose the box with number “1”. You
should watch carefully which box the student will choose. Only you are going
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to see that, since I will not be watching what he / she decides. Do you have any
questions?
Ok, just to shortly repeat the rules, the student that you see on the screen got
10 tokens. Each token is worth (token value adjusted to the grade level) kunas. He
/ shemust decide howmany tokens he / shewants to give to one other, unknown
student. Before you start with your role of observer I have two questions for you:
1. What do you think is fair - how many tokens should the student whom
you see on the screen give to the other student?
2. If the student whom you see on the screen gave 2 tokens to the other
student, how fair would it be? (Experimenter writes down the answers.)
Now you just have to wait a bit longer, until the student from the screen gets
his / her instructions. When he / she is done with instructions, he / she will
start with the game. I will leave now, but I will come back when the student
you are observing finishes with the game. You just sit here and watch what he /
she will do. (The experimenter moves aside and sits on a chair. After the subject’s
paired dictator raises his or her hand, the experimenter comes back, turns off the
video, types in the code that the subject received at the beginning of the study, and
continues with the symbol correspondence test and the questionnaire. At the end of
the study, the subject is told not to talk about the study with other students that
did not yet participate.)
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Appendix 4.C Additional tables and gures
Table 4.4. OLS regressions estimates of the eect of video and age in Control treatment
Variables Dependent variable: given amount of tokens
Control treatment
(1) (2)
Age 0.212*** 0.241*
(0.071) (0.145)
Older children -0.155
video (=1) (0.662)
Constant 0.900 0.664
(0.778) (1.276)
Observations 128 128
R-squared 0.067 0.067
Notes: The table presents OLS regressions using given amount of tokens as the dependent variable.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4.5. Adjustment of the token value
Grade (age) Average weekly pocket allowance Increase Token value Increase
2nd (7-8y) 7.03 kn 1 kn
4th (9-10y) 10.55 kn +50% 1.5 kn +43%
6th (11-12y) 15.55 kn +48% 2.3 kn +50%
8th (13-14y) 23.74 kn +53% 3.5 kn +53%
Notes: Average weekly pocket allowance was calculated based on a previously collected dataset
from 3 Croatian schools. Token value represents the value of 1 token in our study (in Croatian
kunas). Increase measures the relative increase in average weekly pocket allowance or token value
for a grade in row x in comparison to row x – 1, respectively.
4.C Additional tables and gures | 87
Table 4.6. Tobit regressions estimates of treatment eects
Variables Dependent variable: given amount of tokens
7-14y 7-10y 11-14y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-image 0.322 0.330 0.732* 0.564 -0.025 0.054
(0.256) (0.244) (0.374) (0.367) (0.344) (0.328)
Social image 0.301 0.499* 0.529 0.773* 0.090 0.350
(0.272) (0.265) (0.422) (0.398) (0.348) (0.349)
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 3.068*** -0.875 2.594*** -0.235 3.470*** -0.841
(0.189) (2.452) (0.279) (3.926) (0.247) (2.725)
Observations 366 366 166 166 200 200
Pseudo R-sq. 0.001 0.021 0.005 0.027 0.000 0.031
Notes: The table presents tobit regressions using given amount of tokens as the dependent vari-
able with censoring at the amounts of 0 and 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables include daily pocket allowance, standardized measure of pa-
tience, number of siblings, child’s age, cognitive abilities normalized at the age cohort level, and
dummy variables for gender (1 if girl), hearing any information about the experiment before the
session, attempt of communication from dictator towards observer, attempt of communication
from observer towards dictator, and school xed eects.
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Table 4.7. OLS regressions estimates of the eect of age in Control treatment
Variables Dependent variable: given amount of tokens
Control treatment
(1) (2)
Age 0.212*** 0.157**
(0.071) (0.074)
Control variables No Yes
Constant 0.900 -0.430
(0.778) (1.666)
Observations 128 128
R-squared 0.067 0.157
Notes: The table presents OLS regressions using given amount of tokens as the dependent vari-
able. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables include daily
pocket allowance, standardized measure of patience, number of siblings, cognitive abilities nor-
malized at the age cohort level, and dummy variables for gender (1 if girl), hearing any information
about the experiment before the session, and school xed eects.
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Table 4.8. Tobit regressions estimates of treatments eects by gender
Variables Dependent variable: given amount of tokens
Boys Girls Boys and girls Boys
7-14y 7-14y 7-14y 7-10y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Self-image 0.652* 0.658** 0.009 0.030 0.658* 0.654** 1.347***
(0.348) (0.332) (0.370) (0.358) (0.349) (0.332) (0.475)
Social image 0.820** 0.985*** -0.223 -0.012 0.825** 0.967*** 1.160**
(0.368) (0.357) (0.396) (0.382) (0.369) (0.354) (0.516)
Girl (=1) 0.522 0.459
(0.369) (0.349)
Self-image*Girl -0.653 -0.631
(0.506) (0.485)
Social image*Girl -1.047* -0.922*
(0.539) (0.507)
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Constant 2.807*** -2.517 3.314*** 0.615 2.799*** -1.172 2.307***
(0.255) (2.812) (0.274) (3.664) (0.255) (2.462) (0.347)
Observations 180 180 186 186 366 366 86
Pseudo R-sq. 0.008 0.033 0.001 0.020 0.004 0.023 0.024
Boys Boys Girls Girls
7-10y 11-14y 7-10y 11-14y
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Self-image 1.223** -0.026 -0.007 0.077 -0.020 -0.013 0.094
(0.464) (0.491) (0.490) (0.574) (0.572) (0.478) (0.450)
Social image 1.168** 0.457 0.738 -0.220 0.199 -0.243 0.021
(0.473) (0.509) (0.506) (0.680) (0.611) (0.472) (0.468)
Control variables Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 1.377 3.308*** -1.041 2.920*** -2.572 3.603*** -0.159
(3.407) (0.351) (5.832) (0.436) (7.625) (0.346) (2.686)
Observations 86 94 94 80 80 106 106
Pseudo R-sq. 0.069 0.003 0.034 0.001 0.021 0.001 0.040
Notes: The table presents tobit regressions using given amount of tokens as the dependent vari-
able with censoring at the amounts of 0 and 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables include daily pocket allowance, standardized measure of pa-
tience, number of siblings, child’s age, cognitive abilities normalized at the age cohort level, and
dummy variables for hearing any information about the experiment before the session, attempt of
communication from dictator towards observer, attempt of communication from observer towards
dictator, and school xed eects.
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Table 4.9. OLS regressions estimates of the eect of observer’s gender in Social image
treatment
Variables Dependent variable: given amount of tokens
Social image treatment
Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Girl observer (=1) -0.437 -0.601 -0.138 0.018
(0.509) (0.515) (0.520) (0.533)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Constant 3.923*** -2.686 3.281*** 8.345**
(0.390) (3.464) (0.355) (3.161)
Observations 63 63 60 60
R-squared 0.012 0.200 0.001 0.307
Notes: The table presents OLS regressions using given amount of tokens as the dependent vari-
able. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables include daily
pocket allowance, standardizedmeasure of patience, number of siblings, child’s age, cognitive abil-
ities normalized at the age cohort level, and dummy variables for hearing any information about
the experiment before the session, attempt of communication from dictator towards observer, at-
tempt of communication from observer towards dictator, and school xed eects.
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Figure 4.2. Decision screen in Self-image and Social image treatment
Notes: Translated from Croatian, picture is blurred for privacy reasons.
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Figure 4.3. Decision screen in Control treatment with a screenshot of the video used
with 2nd and 4th-grade subjects
Notes: Translated from Croatian.
Figure 4.4. Decision screen in Control treatment with a screenshot of the video used
with 6th and 8th-grade subjects
Notes: Translated from Croatian.
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Figure 4.5. Lab in the eld during an experimental session
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5The Development of Egalitarian
Norm Enforcement in Childhood
and Adolescence ?
Joint with Armin Falk and Fabian Kosse
5.1 Introduction
Egalitarian norm is a long-existing and widely-pervasive organizing principle.
It shapes our everyday behavior, e.g., when we split the bill in a restaurant or
divide the profits from a business venture, and it functions as a crucial driver
behind prosocial behavior (see Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011), determining the
way in which it is frequently modeled (Fehr and K. M. Schmidt, 1999; Falk and
Fischbacher, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). To ensure that people act ac-
cording to the norm, societies rely on enforcement mechanisms. In particular, if
a person violates the egalitarian norm, unaffected third-parties commonly pun-
ish such behavior (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, 2004). The extent of punish-
ment might vary, but the punishment itself is robust and widespread, observed
in societies around the globe (Henrich et al., 2006; Bernhard et al., 2006). How-
ever, while many studies focus on egalitarian norm enforcement among adults,
much less is known about its emergence within human development.
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Despite a rich body of literature investigating the development of children’s
other-regarding preferences (e.g. Fehr et al., 2008, 2013; Almås et al., 2010;
Falk and Kosse, 2016; Deckers et al., 2017; Brocas et al., 2017; Sutter et al.,
2018), less focus is devoted to norm-enforcing behavior. Given its relevance, it
holds strong interest to shed more light on the roots of egalitarian norm enforce-
ment. In particular, as children become less selfish and more willing to share as
they get older (Harbaugh et al., 2003; Benenson et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008,
2013; Bauer et al., 2014; Kosse et al., forthcoming), it is essential to understand
how enforcement, which underpins such behavior, develops. Therefore, in this
paper we investigate the emergence and development of egalitarian norm en-
forcement. More specifically, we take the most commonly-used third-party pun-
ishment game where a third-party is added to a regular dictator game (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006; Bernhard et al., 2006; Lewisch
et al., 2011), adapt it for children’s understanding and run an experiment with
635 children and adolescents aged 9-18.
We show that children start enforcing the egalitarian norm at the age of
11-12. In addition, we show that: (i) as the norm enforcement emerges, a non-
negligible number of punishers also disapprove of highly generous transfers that
exceed the egalitarian norm, (ii) the behavior of punishers only changes until
13-14 years of age, indicating that egalitarian norm enforcement is mainly de-
veloped by that period, and (iii) the dictators increase their transfer towards the
egalitarian norm primarily in same period when the norm enforcement devel-
ops.
Our study contributes to several streams of literature. Primarily, it con-
tributes to the literature on the development of other-regarding behavior, as
we show that the egalitarian norm enforcement mainly develops from 11 to 14
years of age. Moreover, we replicate the most common finding in the mentioned
literature, observing that children’s selfish behavior decreases with age as older
dictators give more on average than the younger ones (Harbaugh et al., 2003;
Benenson et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008, 2013; Bauer et al., 2014; Kosse et al.,
forthcoming). Interestingly, we find that the decrease of selfishness primarily oc-
curs in the period when the egalitarian norm enforcement develops, suggesting
a connection between the two. This provides supporting evidence that punish-
ment is one of the core mechanisms contributing to the commonly-observed
increase of prosocial behavior with increasing age.
Most closely to our paper, our results connect to other third-party punish-
ment studies with young children. Lergetporer et al. (2014) find that 7-11 year-
old children do not enforce the norm of cooperation, while McAuliffe et al.
(2015) and Jordan et al. (2014) find that 6-8 year-old children punish devia-
tions from unfair allocations. Our findings are more in line with the latter, as our
youngest cohort also engages in punishment; however, in contrast to McAuliffe
et al. (2015) and Jordan et al. (2014), we find that the youngest participants
5.1 Introduction | 97
do not enforce the norm, as we still observe substantial punishment at the equal
share. The difference between our findings could be explained by differences in
design and through spiteful preferences or preferences towards advantageous
inequality, which can still be highly present in this development period (Fehr
et al. (2013) and McAuliffe et al. (2014); see discussion in Section 5.4). Com-
plementing the aforementioned studies with young children, our study connects
the behavior from childhood to adulthood, as we record punishment from 9 to
18 years of age. We find that enforcement behavior mainly develops by mid-
adolescence. This supports the major contribution of Almås et al. (2010), who
observe that children’s understanding of fairness still strongly evolves in the
mentioned period. Furthermore, it is in line with the findings of Gummerum
and Chu (2014), who study the development of concerns for outcomes and in-
tentions in second and third parties. While the authors do not observe a change
in third-parties’ concerns for outcomes or intentions in this period, they report
an increase in punishment behavior when moving from pre-adolescence to mid-
adolescence. Looking at our results with older adolescents, we observe that
the punishment behavior does not change from mid-adolescence to adulthood,
where our study connects to other third-party punishment studies with adults
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006; Bernhard et al., 2006;
Lewisch et al., 2011). More specifically, the behavior of the oldest cohorts in
our study is comparable to studies using a similar design with adults (Bernhard
et al., 2006).1
Finally, our results indicate that a non-negligible proportion of children ap-
prove of the egalitarian norm but not above-egalitarian transfers. The finding re-
lates to other third-party punishment studies (Henrich et al., 2006; Gummerum
and Chu, 2014) and complements the growing literature on antisocial punish-
ment (Herrmann et al., 2008; Parks and Stone, 2010; Irwin and Horne, 2013).
Importantly, it connects directly to studies focusing on norm elicitation, where it
has been shown that in contrast to the egalitarian transfer in a dictator game, a
substantial proportion of subjects do not approve of above-egalitarian transfers
(Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016). Our findings
suggest that this normative valuation stretches its roots to a much younger age.
As soon as the norm enforcement emerges, not only selfish but also generous
deviations can be viewed as less appropriate.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we ex-
plain the experimental design and procedure. In Section 5.3, we report the re-
sults of our study. In Section 5.4, we discuss the potential mechanisms behind
our findings, before we finally conclude the paper in Section 5.5.
1 While many studies implement the third-party punishment game where a punisher is added
to a regular dictator game, we limit the punisher’s action space in the same way as in Bernhard
et al. (2006).
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5.2 Experimental design and procedure
We divide the following section into two subsections. In the first subsection,
we explain the experimental design. In the second subsection, we describe the
experimental procedure and the subject pool.
5.2.1 Experimental design
The experimental game we used comprises three players: a dictator, recipient
and punisher (see Figure 5.1). At the beginning of the game, the dictator is
endowed with 10 tokens and has to divide them between him- or herself and
the recipient, who has no endowment. The punisher is endowed with 5 tokens.
After the dictator makes his or her decision, the punisher can punish the dicta-
tor with up to 2 tokens. For each token that the punisher uses, the dictator’s
payoff decreases by 3 but is bounded by a minimum of 0. We limit the choice
of punishment to a maximum of 2 tokens to ensure comprehension with partic-
ipants of all age. To enforce the egalitarian norm, a subject will not punish on
the transfer of 5 but will punish on selfish transfers that deviate from 5 (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006; Bernhard et al., 2006).
Figure 5.1. Dictator game with a third-party punisher
Notes: Dictator is endowed with 10 tokens and has to divide them between him- or herself and
the recipient, who has no endowment. The punisher is endowed with 5 tokens. After the dictator’s
decision, the punisher can punish the dictator with up to 2 of his or her tokens. For each token
that the punisher uses, the dictator’s payo decreases by 3 but is bounded by a minimum of 0.
To gain a comprehensive picture, we implemented the strategymethod. Each
punisher had to indicate how much he or she would punish conditional on every
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potential choice of the dictator.2 We devoted special focus to its implementa-
tion. Instead of a list, the punishers were presented with 11 ordered pages. On
each page, there was one potential transfer from the dictator with depicted pun-
ishment options and vividly-displayed outcomes for each of those options (see
Figure 5.5 in Appendix). This ensured that subjects of all ages and different cog-
nitive abilities were fully aware of the potential payoff outcomes conditional on
their choices.
5.2.2 Procedure and subject pool
The study was conducted in Našice, a small city in eastern Croatia with an ap-
proximate population of 16,000. The participants were students in 3rd, 5th and
7th grade of elementary school and 1st and 3rd grade of high school. The age of
the children was 9-10, 11-12, 13-14, 15-16 and 17-18, respectively.3 Altogether,
635 students from two elementary schools and one high school participated in
the study. The experiment was conducted during regular school hours. Sessions
were organized for each class and each student was assigned one role in the
game, which was the same for everybody in a class. Our approach allowed us to
ensure the avoidance of selection bias when comparing high school and elemen-
tary school subjects. In particular, the participating schools were the only schools
in the local area. Moreover, at the time of the experiment, the participating high
school had the largest number of students among high schools in Croatia, and
it offered a variety of study programs to its students. This allowed us to balance
the sample across the different types of programs within each high school age
cohort (see Table 5.1).4 Three participating classes of students were from three-
year high school programs, and students from different classes were assigned a
different role in the game. Three-year programs are considered the least diffi-
cult to finish and have the lowest enrollment requirements. Furthermore, three
participating classes of students were from four-year non-gymnasium programs
and three were from four-year gymnasium programs. The latter are considered
the most difficult programs and have the highest enrollment requirements. For
both gymnasium and non-gymnasium four-year programs, students from dif-
ferent classes were also assigned different roles in the game. For elementary
2 Note that the strategy method was shown not to influence results of third-party punishment
(Jordan et al., 2016), and was successfully used with 7 year-old children (Lergetporer et al.,
2014).
3 Our sample contains few exceptions where a child is older or younger than his or her class-
mates, e.g., if a child fails a grade or starts school earlier. In our main comparison, we follow the
usual approach in the literature and bin the children based on their age in their corresponding
age cohorts (9-10, 11-12, 13-14, 15-16 and 17-18 years of age). Classifying the children strictly
according to their grade does not change our results.
4 Unlike elementary school education in Croatia, high school education offers multiple study
programs, which students choose based on their preference and prior academic achievement.
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schools, three classes were participating from each grade level and school, and
children across these classes were assigned different roles in the game.5
Table 5.1. Sampling
Grade (age) Elementary Elementary High school
school 1 school 2
3 year 4 year non- 4 year gymn.
program gymn. program program
3rd (9-10) 3 classes 4 classes
5th (11-12) 3 classes 3 classes
7th (13-14) 3 classes 4 classes
1st (15-16) 3 classes 3 classes 3 classes
3rd (17-18) 3 classes 3 classes 3 classes
Notes: The table presents an overview of the amount of participating classes per school, program
and grade level.
During and after the experiment, the players remained anonymous to each
other, although they were aware that the other players were students of simi-
lar age but not from their class. Each student was given a code that served as
identification during the experimental procedure and no names were used. Dur-
ing the experiment, only the experimenters and the children were allowed to
be in the classroom. The environment during the experiment resembled the en-
vironment during a normal school test. The tables where children were sitting
were separated and children were not allowed to talk to each other (see Fig-
ure 5.6 in Appendix). The experimental instructions comprised oral instructions
read by the same experimenter in all experimental sessions (for instructions,
see Appendix 5.B). The oral instructions were supported with posters on the
blackboard, which were incorporated in the structured explanation of the game.
The use of posters with displayed steps of the game was an approach specifi-
cally aimed at assisting in the children’s understanding of the game. To ensure
5 In two grade levels in elementary school 2, we added an additional class to have a balanced
sample size across the two schools. In these two cases, children from the extra class were assigned
the same role in the game as in one of the other three classes.
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standardization, alongside the main explanation of the game, the posters also
contained several examples that were thoroughly explained for each session.
Before the start of the game, each student had to answer three control ques-
tions, each comprising three sub-questions. If a child had problems solving any
of the control questions, an experimenter explained the rules of the game again
just to that child, and assisted in answering the first control question through
explanation. The second and third questions were used as a control of under-
standing. Out of 217 punishers, 180 answered the control questions correctly,
while out of 209 dictators, 193 managed the same. The children who did not
answer the control questions correctly were excluded from the analysis.6 As
the number of participating children across classrooms did not perfectly match,
8 dictators were each matched with 2 punishers, and 2 recipients were each
matched with 2 dictators. After the experimental game, subjects answered a
short questionnaire and took a cognitive abilities test comprising 16 matrices
items.
The experiment was approved by the school principals of all three schools.
Parents of participating children gave written consent for participation after they
were informed about the nature and possible consequences of the study. With
the consent, parents also filled out a small questionnaire with demographic and
socio-economic questions. The tokens that students earned in the game were
converted to Croatian kunas for payment, and were paid out within 2 weeks af-
ter the experiment. The value of a token was adjusted to the age cohort, whereby
students from 3rd grade of elementary school earned 3 kunas for a token, stu-
dents from 5th and 7th grade of elementary school earned 4 kunas for a token,
and students from 1st and 3rd grade of high school earned 5 kunas for a token,
where 1 HRK ≈ 0.17 USD at the time of the experiment. In addition to the earn-
ings in the game, each subject also received a participation fee equivalent to the
value of 2 tokens.
5.3 Results
In the following, we first analyze the behavior of the punishers in two steps: first,
we apply simple mean comparisons to identify when subjects start enforcing the
egalitarian norm; and second, we construct a piecewise linear regression model
to analyze the entire punishment patterns across different age cohorts. After
6 Including these participants into the analysis yields similar results. Specifically, the punish-
ment patterns stay very similar across all age cohorts, while the dictators exhibit an almost iden-
tical development pattern of transfers across age. In addition to those that did not answer the
control questions correctly, we excluded two children with mental disabilities from our data. Nev-
ertheless, they participated, and given that they were unable to finish the tasks, they were paid
the mean earning of their age cohort.
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analyzing the punishers’ behavior, we analyze the development of the dictators’
behavior.
5.3.1 Behavior of the punishers
As a first step of our analysis of punishment behavior, we explore when subjects
start enforcing the egalitarian norm. For this purpose, we first compare pun-
ishment for egalitarian transfer and selfish deviations from the transfer. This
comparison is contrasted through age cohort averages in Figure 5.2. The left
bar represents average punishment in response to selfish transfers (i.e., trans-
fer < 5) and the middle bar represents punishment in response to egalitarian
transfer (i.e., transfer = 5). The average punishment for selfish transfers is ap-
proximately 1 token for all age cohorts. For the youngest cohort, the egalitarian
transfer does not provoke a significantly different punishment than selfish trans-
fers (p = 0.147, two-sided t-test, N = 32). For age cohorts 11-12 and older,
the average punishment on egalitarian transfer decreases and is significantly
smaller compared to punishment for selfish transfers (p < 0.001 for each age
cohort above 9-10, two-sided t-test, N(11-12) = 25, N(13-14) = 31, N(15-16)
= 39, N(17-18) = 53). The result is driven by the fact that the proportion of chil-
dren punishing the egalitarian transfer sharply decreases for the older cohorts.
While for the 9-10 age cohort 65% of children punish on egalitarian transfer,
the amount decreases to, e.g., 32% for the 11-12 cohort. This indicates that
starting at age 11-12, the majority of children approve of the egalitarian norm
and selfish deviations from the norm provoke higher punishment. A robustness
check controlling for individual differences in, e.g., gender and parental income
supports this finding (see Appendix 5.A).
Next, we analyze punishers’ behavior on generous transfers. In Figure 5.2,
with the right bar, we also present punishment in response to a marginal gen-
erous deviation from the norm (i.e., transfer = 6). Note that we only focus on
punishment in response to a transfer of 6. As the transfer increases beyond 6, the
punishment decreases, which is mechanically driven (see Figure 5.3; given very
high transfers, for the punisher using only one punishment token is sufficient to
make the dictator end with zero tokens). We observe that for the youngest co-
hort the punishment for marginal generous deviation is slightly smaller than for
egalitarian transfer. Together, the bars present a decreasing punishment pattern
with relatively high punishment for the egalitarian transfer, inconsistent with
egalitarian norm enforcement. Beginning at 11-12 years of age, children exhibit
lower punishment for egalitarian transfer than for marginal generous deviation
from it. Even though the difference is statistically insignificant for most of the co-
horts (p > 0.240 for age cohorts 11-12, 15-16, 17-18, p = 0.018 for age cohort
13-14, two-sided t-test, N(11-12) = 25, N(13-14) = 31, N(15-16) = 39, N(17-
18) = 53), it implies that some children do not approve of generous deviations
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Figure 5.2. Average punishment amount by age cohort
Notes: Average punishment on egalitarian transfer of 5 tokens (t = 5), average of mean punish-
ment on transfers smaller than 5 tokens, i.e., selsh deviations (t < 5) and average punishment on
transfers of 6 tokens, i.e., marginal generous deviation (t = 6). Error bars show standard error of the
means. Children from age cohorts 11-12 and higher exhibit a highly signicant dierence between
punishment on t = 5 and t < 5 (p = 0.147 for 9-10 age cohort, p < 0.001 for each age cohort above
9-10, two-sided t-test, N(9-10) = 32, N(11-12) = 25, N(13-14) = 31, N(15-16) = 39, N(17-18) = 53).
from the norm and are willing to punish them. In particular, a non-negligible
proportion of 11-12 year-olds (20%) do not punish on egalitarian transfer yet
punish on marginal generous deviation from it. This finding is robust for all
older cohorts (9% for age cohort 9-10, 23-36% for age cohorts above 11-12).
We discuss the motivation behind punishment on above-egalitarian transfers as
well as the motivation behind the punishment behavior of the youngest cohort
in the Discussion section (5.4). Altogether, starting from 11-12 years of age, we
observe that the majority of children approve of the egalitarian transfer. On av-
erage, selfish deviations, and by some even generous deviations, incur higher
punishment. Hence, first indications of the egalitarian norm enforcement occur
among 11-12 year-old children.
As a second step of our analysis concerning punishment behavior, we in-
spect the entire punishment pattern. Figure 5.3 shows the (i) average punish-
ment amount conditional on the dictator’s transfer for all age cohorts, and (ii)
a plotted piecewise linear regression model that we designed to investigate fur-
ther development in the punishment pattern starting from 11-12 years of age
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(model estimation in Table 5.2). In particular, while our first part of the analysis
indicates when subjects start enforcing the egalitarian norm, the model allows
us to observe whether there is any further development of punishment after en-
forcement emerges. The main characteristic of the model is that it allows for two
break points (jumps). More specifically, we observe that the main punishment
changes happen in response to transfers of 4, 5 and 6; hence, we build the model
to detect a potential change in the punishment pattern when contrasting pun-
ishment decisions on deviations to 4 and 6 tokens with punishment decisions
on larger deviations. The model also allows for different slopes before and after
the egalitarian norm (see Equation 1).
The dependent variable yi t represents the amount of punishment chosen by
a third party i in reaction to a dictator’s transfer of t ∈ {0,1, ..., 10}, where t is
used to estimate the change in punishment for transfers 0 to 4. d1t is a dummy
variable used to estimate the change (jump) in the punishment pattern when
going from a transfer of 4 to 5, whereby it is 0 for t < 5 and 1 for t ≥ 5. d2t is a
dummy variable used to estimate the change (jump) in the punishment pattern
when going from a transfer of 5 to 6, whereby it is 0 for t < 6 and 1 for t ≥ 6.
t′ allows for different slopes before and after the egalitarian norm, hence, it is
0 for t < 5 and t – 5 for t ≥ 5.7
yi t = β0 + β1 t + β2d1t + β3d2t + β4 t
′ + εi t (1)
First, we inspect the average punishment patterns as presented in Figure 5.3.
9-10 year-old children exhibit a downward-sloping punishment pattern, where
the response to egalitarian transfer does not stand out from the rest. Starting
with 11-12 years of age, the egalitarian transfer incurs much less punishment
and on average becomes the least-punished transfer (not including highest trans-
fers). This confirms our results from the first part of the analysis.
Next, we inspect the development of the punishment pattern starting from
the 11-12 age cohort using the estimated coefficients of our regression model
(see Table 5.2). For 11-12 year-old children, the pattern indicates that amarginal
selfish deviation from the egalitarian norm is directly answered by pronounced
punishment in comparison to greater deviations (Column (2), coefficient of the
punishment jump for transfers 4 to 5 (β2), p = 0.033, two-sided t-test, N =
275). The punishment for greater selfish deviations increases gradually (slope
regarding transfers 0 to 4 (β1), p < 0.001, two-sided t-test, N = 275). In con-
trast to 11-12 year-olds, 13-14 year-old children exhibit an approximately two
7 We apply clustered standard errors, which takes into account the fact that punishment deci-
sions are dependent within the subject but independent across subjects.
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Figure 5.3. Actual and predicted punishment for all transfers by age cohort
Notes: The black dots show the average observed punishment. The blue dashed line shows the
prediction of punishment based on our piecewise linear model, which allows for a jump in punish-
ment on marginal deviations from the egalitarian norm and dierent slopes before and after the
egalitarian norm. Error bars show standard errors of the means.
times larger punishment response for the marginal selfish deviation in compar-
ison to greater deviations (Column (3), coefficient of the punishment jump for
transfers 4 to 5 (β2), p = 0.001, two-sided t-test, N = 341). Simultaneously,
there is a smaller increase for greater selfish deviations than among 11-12 year-
old children (slope regarding transfers 0 to 4 (β1), p = 0.239, two-sided t-test,
N = 341). This punishment pattern of pronounced response to the marginal
selfish deviation and a small punishment increase on greater deviations contin-
ues for 15-16 and 17-18 year-old children (Columns (4) and (5)). Together, the
regressions show that although the egalitarian norm enforcement is first visible
at 11-12 years of age, the punishment pattern still develops until 13-14 years of
age. As the subjects approach adulthood, we do not identify any further devel-
opments of the pattern.
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Table 5.2. Piecewise linear regression models
Variables Dependent variable: punishment amount
Age cohort: 9-10 11-12 13-14 15-16 17-18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transfer (β1) -0.038 -0.148*** -0.065 -0.046 -0.058**
(0.039) (0.033) (0.054) (0.035) (0.028)
Dummy 4-5 (β2) -0.081 -0.236** -0.529*** -0.426*** -0.523***
(0.178) (0.105) (0.151) (0.140) (0.114)
Dummy 5-6 (β3) -0.209 0.264* 0.416*** 0.362** 0.219*
(0.144) (0.151) (0.136) (0.172) (0.111)
Transfer’ (β4) -0.059 0.028 -0.035 -0.115** -0.006
(0.059) (0.037) (0.081) (0.050) (0.042)
Constant (β0) 1.206*** 1.336*** 1.077*** 1.169*** 1.155***
(0.108) (0.164) (0.149) (0.124) (0.089)
Observations 352 275 341 429 583
R-squared 0.204 0.319 0.211 0.232 0.222
Notes: The table presents OLS regression models using punishment as the dependent variable.
Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. β1
estimates the slope for transfers 0 to 4 (Transfer (t) ∈ 0, 1, ..., 10). β2 estimates the change (jump)
in the punishment pattern when going from a transfer of 4 to 5 (Dummy 4-5 = 0 for t < 5 and 1 for
t ≥ 5). β3 estimates the change (jump) in the punishment pattern when going from a transfer of
5 to 6 (Dummy 5-6 = 0 for t < 6 and 1 for t ≥ 6 ). β4 estimates the change in the slope for t ≥ 6
(Transfer’ = 0 for t < 5 and t– 5 for t ≥ 5).
On the generous side of the egalitarian norm, we observe that starting from
11-12 years of age, deviations from the norm are also answered by an increase
in punishment (coefficient of the punishment jump for transfers 5 to 6 (β3),
p = 0.094, two-sided t-test, N = 275). The behavior does not exhibit any de-
velopmental pattern from 11-12 to 17-18 year-olds, but it further supports our
prior observation regarding punishment for marginal generous deviation from
the norm.
5.3.2 Behavior of the dictators
In the last step of our analysis, we inspect the sharing behavior of the dicta-
tors. As the punishers’ behavior reveals the emergence of the egalitarian norm
enforcement, we investigate whether this is reflected in the dictators’ behav-
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ior. Figure 5.4 shows the average transfers by age cohort. Children from the
youngest cohort transfer the smallest average amount (1.86 tokens). Regressing
the amount of transfer on the age cohort yields a positive coefficient (p = 0.039,
OLS regression model, N = 193). However, this increase in transfers seems to
be non-linear. It primarily occurs from 11-12 to 13-14 years of age, where the
average transfer increases from 1.91 to 3.35 (p = 0.016, two-sided t-test, N(11-
12) = 33, N(13-14) = 33). For the older cohorts, the transfer decreases slightly
in comparison to the 13-14 age cohort, although the decrease is not statistically
significant (p > 0.179 for both 15-16 and 17-18 age cohorts, two-sided t-test,
N(13-14) = 33, N(15-16) = 61, N(17-18)= 44). This pattern indicates that the
development of the dictators’ behavior mirrors that of the punishers’ behavior.
Specifically, we observe that the egalitarian norm enforcement mainly develops
from 11 to 14 years of age. Simultaneously, dictators change their behavior in
the direction of the egalitarian norm in the corresponding time period.
Figure 5.4. Average dictator’s transfer by age cohort
Notes: Error bars show standard errors of the means. There is an upward trend of transfers by age
cohort. Regressing the amount of transfer on the age cohort yields a positive coecient (p = 0.039,
OLS regression model, N = 193); however, the increase seems to be non-linear. It primarily occurs
from 11-12 to 13-14 years of age, where the average transfer increases from 1.91 to 3.35 (p = 0.016,
two-sided t-test, N(11-12) = 33, N(13-14) = 33).
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5.4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss potential mechanisms behind our findings. First, we
focus on the punishment behavior of our youngest cohort: The 9-10 year-old
children use the punishment tool but not to enforce the egalitarian norm, as
they gradually decrease their punishment with the dictator’s transfer and still
punish the equal share. These findings relate to the discussion on the develop-
ment of other-regarding behavior. On the one hand, our findings are at odds
with studies reporting prevalent egalitarian behavior at the age of our youngest
cohort. Most popularly, Fehr et al. (2008) use three simple games to classify
3-8 year-old children in other-regarding types. They observe that the majority
of children (60%) become egalitarian by the age of 7-8. They find that other
preferences, such as spiteful preferences where the subject’s utility decreases
with the other’s payoff, diminish by that age. On the other hand, several studies
report that spiteful preferences persist longer, offering a potential explanation
for our findings. Fehr et al. (2013) also classify other-regarding types using a
more similar experimental procedure to ours8, finding that the majority of sub-
jects are still spiteful (42%) at the age of 8-9 (alternatively, these subjects could
also care about advantageous inequality, i.e., they prefer to have more than oth-
ers). Moreover, McAuliffe et al. (2014) also find high levels of spiteful behavior
for similarly-aged children as our youngest cohort, while both McAuliffe et al.
(2014) and Fehr et al. (2013) report that this type of behavior decreases with
age. Hence, it seems unclear when spitefulness exactly diminishes, and in line
with the latter studies, our youngest punishers could have spiteful preferences
and punish the dictators simply to reduce their payoff, or they could also care
about advantageous inequality and punish the dictators to have more than them.
Furthermore, the comparison with Jordan et al. (2014) and McAuliffe et al.
(2015) also supports this explanation. In particular, McAuliffe et al. (2015)9 run
an experiment with 5-6 year-old children in which a third party can punish un-
fair allocations between two players. In comparison to our design, the punisher
always obtains a much larger endowment in the one-shot game; hence, the pun-
isher is not comparing him- or herself with others in the same egalitarian way as
in our design. In contrast to the findings with our youngest cohort, they observe
that 6 year-old children already do not punish much on the fair choice. This
difference could be explained by spiteful preferences, or preferences towards
8 While both Fehr et al. (2008) and Fehr et al. (2013) use the same binary games, in Fehr
et al. (2013) (i) the experiment was conducted in large group sessions in a classroom and not
one-to-one with the experimenter, and (ii) the children were incentivized with money rather than
candy. The same holds true for our experiment.
9 Jordan et al. (2014) run an experiment with the same game and similarly-aged children as
in McAuliffe et al. (2015), but they investigate the influence of in- and out-group bias and its
emergence.
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advantageous inequality.10 In support of this explanation, the findings of Gum-
merum and Chu (2014) are more fitting with the behavior of our youngest co-
hort.While our design has several differences comparedwith that of Gummerum
and Chu, the punisher’s endowment is not one of them.11 In particular, the au-
thors investigate the development of concerns for outcomes and intentions with
second- and third-party punishers. In order to manipulate intentions, they run
several mini-third-party punishment games, where the dictator can only choose
between two division options. If we look at the specific game where dictators
choose between dividing equally or keeping most for themselves, the authors
report a substantial average amount spent on punishing the equal share for 8
year-olds, which decreases for older subjects. This is in line with our findings.
Conclusively, while we cannot deduce a single motive, spiteful preferences
or preferences towards advantageous inequality are a plausible explanation for
the behavior of our youngest cohort.12 Moreover, the comparison between our
study and that of McAuliffe et al. (2015)might offer a valuable insight. McAuliffe
et al. indicate that children already care about the fair allocation between two
subjects at a very young age. However, in an egalitarian setup where all sub-
jects possess the same endowment, our study would suggest that children are
still driven by other factors at the age of 9-10, i.e., they might still be driven
by self-comparison motives such as spiteful preferences or preferences towards
advantageous inequality. Hence, if children’s understanding of a normative vio-
lation exists at a younger age, it might be dominated by other factors until 11-12
years of age.
Next, we discuss our finding regarding above-egalitarian punishment. We
observe that a non-negligible proportion of children approve of the egalitarian
but not above-egalitarian transfers. This behavior is inconsistent with outcome-
based models of other-regarding behavior (e.g. Fehr and K. M. Schmidt, 1999),
but could be explainedwith social norm basedmodels (Krupka andWeber, 2013;
Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016). While both types of models emphasize the
normative value of the equal share, the latter posit that each action has a social-
normative value that indicates its appropriateness. Furthermore, Krupka and
10 In the case of using spitefulness as an explanation, a subject’s utility component representing
the influence of other’s payoff should be concave in the payoff differences (at least in the advan-
tageous domain), i.e., reducing the other player’s payoff by 1 yields a larger utility increase if
payoffs are close than if the other player has a much smaller payoff.
11 Gummerum and Chu (2014) implement several mini-third-party games, where the dictator
always has two possibilities how to divide 10 points. He or she can choose to give 2 points or
an alternative allocation. Depending on the game, the alternative allocation can be 0, 2, 5 or 8
points. The punisher is endowed with 5 points, and can punish the dictator with up to 5 points.
Each points reduces the dictator’s payoff by 2.
12 Another explanation for the punishment pattern that we observe is that young children only
approve of overly generous transfers. However, this explanation lacks support in the literature
and might also seem unintuitive.
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Weber (2013) and Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2016) show through norm
elicitation methods that in the dictator game people on average approve more of
the egalitarian transfer than above-egalitarian transfers. More specifically, there
is a consensus about the appropriateness of the egalitarian transfer, yet less so
with above-egalitarian transfers. While some subjects approve of transferring
high amounts, others do not. This is in line with our observation that only some
subjects engage in punishment of above-egalitarian behavior. Alternatively, one
can explain these results through descriptive norms, i.e., each deviation from
the usual behavior encounters punishment (Irwin and Horne, 2013), or one can
think of the above-egalitarian punishment as “derogation of the do-gooders"
(Monin, 2007).
Finally, we discuss the finding that dictators’ transfers primarily increase in
the period as the norm enforcement develops, suggesting a connection between
the two. This provides supporting evidence that punishment is one of the core
mechanisms contributing to the commonly-observed increase of prosocial behav-
ior with age (Harbaugh et al., 2003; Benenson et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008,
2013; Bauer et al., 2014; Kosse et al., forthcoming). Indeed, the mere threat of
punishment is crucial for the prosocial and cooperative behavior of adults (Fehr
and Gächter, 2002; Herrmann et al., 2008). Alternatively, it is possible that the
observed increase of dictators’ transfers is not due to the emergence of punish-
ment. An underlying variable, e.g., the internalization of norms could be driving
the development both norm-enforcing punishment and prosocial behavior as we
observe it. While investigating the internalization of norms is a very interesting
question, it remains rather intangible to actually confirm when a behavior starts
being a norm. Nevertheless, several studies indicate an understanding of norms
at a very young age (e.g. Fehr et al., 2008; M. F. H. Schmidt and Sommerville,
2011), which questions the argument that the internalization of norms could be
solely responsible for the observed simultaneous changes in behavior during the
period of 11-14 years of age.
5.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the emergence and development of egal-
itarian norm enforcement in childhood and adolescence. We took the most
commonly-used third-party punishment game for adults, adapted it to ensure
children’s understanding and ran an experiment with 635 subjects aged 9-18.
We show that enforcement of the egalitarian norm starts at the age of 11-12,
and mainly develops until the age of 13-14. Furthermore, we find that as the
egalitarian norm enforcement emerges, a non-negligible proportion of punish-
ers also disapprove of transfers that go above the egalitarian norm. Finally, we
observe that the dictators increase their average transfer towards the egalitarian
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norm primarily in the period when we observe that norm enforcement develops.
Our results suggest punishment as one of the core mechanisms that underpins
children’s increased prosocial behavior with increasing age. Furthermore, our
findings suggest that the negative valuation of exceeding the norm, which was
reported in studies with adults, has roots in a much younger age.
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Appendix 5.A Robustness check
The punishment pattern that we report in the main text reveals that starting at
11-12 years of age, the majority of children enforce the egalitarian norm. In this
robustness check, we further check whether the reported pattern is driven by dif-
ferent sample compositions of respective cohorts. For this purpose, we present
multivariate regressions controlling for gender, cognitive abilities, parental in-
come and pocket money. Table 5.3 shows four regression models. The depen-
dent variable indicates whether a respective subject is a norm enforcer or not.
In the first twomodels, the dependent variable “norm enforcer" is 1 if the subject
does not punish on the egalitarian transfer but uses a total of at least 2 tokens
for punishment on transfers smaller than 5 (egalitarian transfer), and 0 other-
wise. The dependent variable for the latter two models is 1 if the subject does
not punish on the egalitarian transfer but uses a total of at least 4 tokens on
transfers smaller than 5, and 0 otherwise. The latter two models are included to
provide a more robust definition of norm enforcers. The regressions show that
in comparison to the 9-10 age cohort, being in an older age cohort significantly
increases the likelihood of being a norm enforcer. This holds true if we control
for gender, cognitive abilities, parental income and pocket money, thus confirm-
ing that there is an age-dependent increase of norm enforcement starting with
11-12 years of age.
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Appendix 5.B Experimental instructions
The following section contains experimental instructions translated from Croat-
ian.
5.B.1 Dictator
Let’s start with the study. This study is conducted in a way that you play a game.
Before the beginning of the game, I will explain the rules to you, so please listen
carefully and do not talk. In the game, you will earn money, and all of the money
that you earn will be given to you by us in an envelope. Each of you will receive
(value of 2 tokens expressed in kunas given the age cohort), and additionally you
will receive the amount of money that you earn in the game. There are no wrong
answers in the game, but the amount of money that you earn will depend on
your answers and the answers of other participants, so be very careful. Also,
please do not look at your neighbor’s sheet, but make decisions in the game by
yourself.
The game is played in groups of 3 players. Each of you is the first player in
your group. The second and third player from each group are also students of
your age. I will not tell you who they are, neither will I tell them your names.
This will remain a secret. The game is played with tokens. Each token is worth
(value of one token expressed in kunas given the age cohort). This means that for
each token that you have at the end of the game, you will receive those (value of
one token expressed in kunas given the age cohort). This holds for you, and also
for other players in the game.
In the game, as first players each of you have 10 tokens. Your task in the
game is to divide those 10 tokens between you and the second player. You can
divide the 10 tokens between yourself and the second player in any way that
you want. The second player cannot influence your decision, and at the end of
the game the second player will only have those tokens that you gave him.
This is how your decision sheet looks. Here you will decide how to divide
the tokens (show first player’s decision sheet on the poster and give 3 transfer
examples, see Fig 5.7). But before you make your decision about the division of
tokens between yourself and the second player, you have to know what the role
of the third player is. The third player, if he chooses, can affect the number of
tokens that you will have at the end of the game. Let’s see how (following on the
poster while explaining verbally, see Figure 5.8). At the beginning of the game,
you have to divide tokens between yourself and the second player. Let’s imagine
that you leave 8 tokens for yourself, and you give 2 tokens to the second player.
The second player will keep those 2 tokens at the end of the game. Whether you
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will keep all of your tokens depends on the third player. The third player has
5 tokens. From those 5 tokens, if he chooses, he can use 2 tokens as deduction
tokens. With those 2 tokens, he can reduce the number of your tokens. For each
deduction token that he uses, your number of tokens will be reduced by 3. Let’s
see this on the poster. If the third player does not use any of his tokens as a
deduction token, he is left with all of his tokens, and you are left with all of your
8 tokens that you left for yourself. If the third player uses 1 deduction token, he
is left with 4 tokens, and the number of your tokens is reduced by 3. You left 8
tokens to yourself, and now you will have 8 minus 3, so you will have 5 tokens.
If the third player uses 2 deduction tokens, he is left without those 2 tokens, so
he will have 3 tokens, and the number of your tokens is reduced by 6. You left 8
tokens to yourself, and now you will have 6 less, so you will have 2 tokens. Let’s
see more examples. (Show all possible third player’s choices on 2 examples of first
player’s transfers by using posters with calculations of the outcome. Explain that
the first player cannot have less than 0 tokens at the end of the game.)
Does anybody have any questions?
Ok, now before we start the game, you have to answer three questions. These
questions will help you to better understand the game, and it will show us if
you have understood the game. If something is not clear, please ask. We will
explain again if you have problems with correctly answering the questions. Now
please turn the first page of your sheet where it says control questions and start
answering. When you are done, lay down your pencil and wait, do not turn
the pages any further. (Wait until everybody in the classroom has answered the
questions.)
Now turn to the page of the game, and divide the tokens as you wish.
5.B.2 Punisher
Let’s start with the study. This study is conducted in a way that you play a game.
Before the beginning of the game, I will explain the rules to you, so please listen
carefully and do not talk. In the game you will earn money, and all of the money
that you earn will be given to you by us in an envelope. Each of you will receive
(value of 2 tokens expressed in kunas given the age cohort), and additionally you
will receive the amount of money that you earn in the game. There are no wrong
answers in the game, but the amount of money that you earn will depend on
your answers and those of other participants, so be very careful. Also, please do
not look at your neighbor’s sheet, but make decisions in the game by yourself.
The game is played in groups of 3 players. Each of you is the third player
in your group. The first and second player from each group are also students of
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your age. I will not tell you who they are, neither will I tell them your names.
This will remain a secret. The game is played with tokens. Each token is worth
(value of one token expressed in kunas given the age cohort). That means that for
each token that you have at the end of the game, you will receive those (value of
one token expressed in kunas given the age cohort). This holds for you, and also
for other players in the game.
I have already played the game with the first and second players. Each first
player in the group received 10 tokens. The first player had to divide those
tokens between himself and the second player. He could divide those tokens as
he wished, and the second player had no influence on his decision.
Let’s look at one example (following on the poster while explaining verbally,
see Figure 5.8). So, these are the 10 tokens that the first player had to divide.
This is one example of how the first player could have divided those tokens
between himself and the second player. Here, the first player left 8 tokens for
himself, while he gave the second player 2 tokens. The second player will keep
those 2 tokens at the end of the game. Whether the first player will keep all
of his 8 tokens depends on you. Here we can see how. Each of you is the third
player in your group, and each of you has 5 tokens. From those 5 tokens, if you
wish, you can use 2 tokens as deduction tokens. With those 2 tokens, you can
reduce the number of tokens of the first player. For each deduction token that
you use, the number of the first player’s tokens decreases by 3. And he is aware
of this fact. If you do not want to use any of the tokens, you will be left with all
5 tokens, and the first player will also be left with all of his tokens. If you use
1 of your tokens as a deduction token, you will be left with 4 tokens, and the
amount of first player’s tokens will decrease by 3. How many tokens will he be
left with? He had 8 tokens, now he has 3 less, so he will be left with 5 tokens.
If you use 2 of your tokens as deduction tokens, you are left with 3 tokens, and
the amount of the first player’s tokens will decrease by 6. How many will he be
left with? At the beginning he had 8, now he has 6 less, so he will be left with
2 tokens. Let’s now look at an example of how exactly the game looks. (Show
all possible third player’s choices on 2 examples of first player’s transfers by using
the third player’s decision sheet as a poster, see Figure 5.5. Explain that the first
player cannot have less than 0 tokens.)
Does anybody have any questions?
Ok, now before we start the game, you have to answer three questions. These
questions will help you to better understand the game, and it will show us if
you have understood the game. If something is not clear, please ask. We will
explain again if you have problems with correctly answering the questions. Now
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please turn the first page of your sheet where it says control questions and start
answering. When you are done, lay down your pencil and wait, do not turn the
pages any further. (Wait until everybody in the classroom answered the questions.)
Now we will start with the game. As I have said, the first player gave to
the second player as many tokens as he wanted, from 0 to 10. But you still do
not know how many he gave him, and I will not tell you yet. When you open
the decision sheets, you will see all of the possibilities of how the first player
could have divided the tokens, with one possibility on each page. I want you to
state how many deduction tokens you would use in each situation. So, first you
will see a situation where the first player gave 0 tokens. You decide how many
deduction tokens you would use in that situation. Then you turn to the next page,
where you will see a situation where the first player gave 1 token. You decide
how many tokens you would use in that situation. Then you turn to the next
page, and so on. After you decide how many deduction tokens you would use
on all possible divisions of the tokens, we will check how the first player actually
divided the tokens. We will see how many deduction tokens you decided to use
on that division, and then apply only that decision. (Short pause.) Ok? So, you
decide for every possible first player’s division how many deduction tokens you
would use. But only one of your decisions will determine the payoff at the end
of the game. You are still not aware which decision it is, so carefully decide on
each possible division. Are there any questions? (Explain the procedure again in
case somebody does not fully understand.) Now open the first page, and start the
game.
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Appendix 5.C Additional tables and gures
Table 5.3. Probit regressions estimates of age cohort eects
Variables Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
norm enf. (≥ 2 tokens) norm enf. (≥ 4 tokens)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basis: 9-10 age cohort
11-12 age cohort 0.239* 0.233* 0.252** 0.243**
(0.128) (0.130) (0.121) (0.118)
13-14 age cohort 0.299** 0.305** 0.329*** 0.273**
(0.119) (0.130) (0.113) (0.118)
15-16 age cohort 0.257** 0.347** 0.274*** 0.340**
(0.113) (0.150) (0.106) (0.134)
17-18 age cohort 0.398*** 0.473*** 0.379*** 0.481***
(0.102) (0.134) (0.097) (0.119)
Gender (1 if male) -0.027 -0.086
(0.082) (0.081)
Cognitive abilities 0.030 0.016
(0.041) (0.040)
Pocket money (1 if yes) -0.054 -0.030
(0.104) (0.104)
Family income 0.029 0.027
(0.028) (0.028)
Observations 180 163 180 163
Notes: The table presents probit regressions using dummy variable for being a norm enforcer
(= 1 if subjects is a norm enforcer) as the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reported coecients represent average marginal eects evaluated
at sample means. Norm enforcer (min. 2 tokens) is 1 if a subject does not punish on the transfer
of 5 (egal. transfer) but uses a total of at least 2 tokens for punishing transfers smaller than 5, and
0 otherwise. Norm enforcer (min. 4 tokens) is 1 if a subject does not punish on the transfer of 5
but uses a total of at least 4 tokens for punishing transfers smaller than 5, and 0 otherwise. The
value for cognitive abilities was normed for each of the age cohorts using the dictators’, recipients’
and punishers’ test results to avoid confounding age and cognitive abilities eects. Family income
is measured in 7 categories; it takes a value of 1 if family income < 2000 HRK, 2 if family income
≥ 2000 and < 4000 HRK, 3 if family income≥ 4000 and < 6000 HRK,..., 7 if family income≥ 12000
HRK. Models (2) and (4) include controls for high school program xed eects.
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Figure 5.5. Punisher’s decision sheet: example of dictator’s transfer of 5 tokens
Notes: Translated from Croatian.
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Figure 5.6. Experimental session
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Figure 5.7. Dictator’s decision sheet
Notes: Translated from Croatian.
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Figure 5.8. Poster used during oral instructions for the main explanation of the game
Notes: Translated from Croatian.
